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Abstract
Standard models of investment predict that credit-constrained rms should grow rapidly
when given additional capital, and that how this capital is provided should not a¤ect decisions
to invest in the business or consume the capital. We randomly gave cash and in-kind grants
to male- and female-owned microenterprises in urban Ghana. Our ndings cast doubt on
the ability of capital alone to stimulate the growth of female microenterprises. First, while
the average treatment e¤ects of the in-kind grants are large and positive for both males
and females, the gain in prots is almost zero for women with initial prots below the
median, suggesting that capital alone is not enough to grow subsistence enterprises owned
by women. Second, for women we strongly reject equality of the cash and in-kind grants;
only in-kind grants lead to growth in business prots. The results for men also suggest a
lower impact of cash, but di¤erences between cash and in-kind grants are less robust. The
di¤erence in the e¤ects of cash and in-kind grants is associated more with a lack of self-
control than with external pressure. As a result, the manner in which funding is provided
a¤ects microenterprise growth. JEL Codes: O12, O16, C93
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1 Introduction
Despite the emphasis placed by micronance organizations on lending to female business owners,
evidence from three recent randomized controlled trials has cast doubt on the ability of capital
alone to grow female-operated microenterprises (de Mel et al 2008, Banerjee et al 2010, and
Karlan and Zinman 2010).1 The three experiments were all run in South and Southeast Asian
countries: Sri Lanka, India and the Philippines. In Sri Lanka, the capital was provided as
grants, while in India and the Philippines, capital was provided by increasing the availability of
microloans. In Sri Lanka and the Philippines, the lack of returns in female-owned enterprises
contrasted with evidence of positive returns in male-owned enterprises.
One possible interpretation is that female-owned microenterprises in these countries are al-
ready operating at their e¢ cient level of capital, which just happens to be very low for most rms.
Emran et al. (2007), for instance, argue that many of the women drawn into self-employment
have low e¢ cient scale and are only self-employed because of labor market imperfections. Labor
market imperfections for women may be particularly strong in societies like those in South Asia,
as evidenced by low labor force participation rates among women. This raises the question of
whether capital might be more successful in growing female-owned microenterprises in other
areas of the world.2 In much of Africa, for example, female labor force participation rates are
higher than in Asia, and women are more integral to household income generation. It is therefore
possible that the scope for female rm growth from more capital is higher in Africa.
An alternative explanation is that the small scale of many female-owned rms is in fact not
e¢ cient, but instead arises from a lack of separation between household and business decision-
making and from ine¢ ciencies in the way people allocate assets between them. One form of
ine¢ ciency can arise from self-control problems, leading individuals to not undertake productive
investments today that have large payo¤s in the future (Banerjee and Mullainathan, 2010; Duo
et al, 2010). A second form of ine¢ ciency can come from ine¢ cient intra-household allocation
of resources (Udry, 1996; Somville, 2011) or pressure to share with others in ones social network
(Charlier, 1999; Platteau, 2000; di Falco and Bulte, 2009). Either of these cases can cause a
1Bjorvatn et al. (2011) also nd no e¤ect of capital grants on either male of female small businesses in Tanzania,
but their sample is restricted to non-credit constrained entrepreneurs so it is unclear how relevant these ndings
are for microenterpreneurs in general.
2This is related to the more general issue of external validity, a common refrain in recent debates about what
the profession is learning from randomized experiments (e.g. Banerjee and Duo, 2009; Ravallion, 2009; Deaton
2010).
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lack of asset integration, so that it is not only how much capital, but the form that this capital
comes in, which determines the extent to which it helps grow the business.
This paper uses a randomized experiment in Ghana to test between competing models of
microenterprise investment and growth and thereby better understand the conditions under
which capital alone is enough for enterprise growth. The intervention itself is closely modeled
on the design used by de Mel et al. (2008, 2009a) in Sri Lanka. A sample of both female and
male microenterprise owners who had no paid employees at the time of the baseline survey were
randomly allocated into treatment and control groups. The treatment group received grants of
150 Ghanaian cedis (approximately $120 at the time of the baseline). As in Sri Lanka, half the
grants were provided in cash and half in kind. A key di¤erence is that the Ghanaian sample
contains more than twice as many rms as in the Sri Lankan study, providing more power to
distinguish the e¤ects of providing capital in di¤erent forms.
The experiment conrms some of the ndings from the Asian experiments, but adds con-
siderable nuance to our understanding of the role of access to additional capital in determining
the growth of female-owned enterprises. A one-time in-kind grant of 150 cedis is estimated to
increase monthly prots by 37-39 cedis for both males and females, a large average return on
this grant. However, among females, in-kind grants only lead to prot increases for the top 40
percent of businesses in terms of initial size. Women running smaller subsistence businesses, i.e.,
those earning $1 per day on average, saw no gains from access to additional capital. In contrast
the returns for males occur for both smaller and larger rms.3 As in Sri Lanka, capital alone
does not appear to be enough to grow subsistence businesses run by women.
We nd that cash grants of the same size had a signicantly smaller e¤ect, increasing prots
by only 10-14 cedis on average. When the sample is split between women and men, we nd that
the di¤erent in treatment e¤ect between in-kind and cash grants is signicant among women
but not among men. In some specications, but not all, men show signicant increases in prots
following the cash grants. This result is not signicant when we condition on our baseline data,
however. We nd that the cash grants tend to be spent on household consumption or transferred
3The high marginal returns to the capital shocks for males are consistent with non-experimental work in Ghana
which has found evidence of high returns to capital for male-owned informal enterprises. Bigsten et al. (2000) nd
much higher returns to physical capital than human capital in African small and medium scale manufacturing
rms, Udry and Anagol (2006) nd returns to be at least 60 percent per year among purchasers of used auto
parts in Accra, and Schündeln (2006) nds strong evidence of nancing constraints among small Ghanaian rms
using a structural modeling approach.
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out of the house, especially when given to women whose businesses were small to begin with.
The experiment allows us to test between three competing models of microenterprise invest-
ment and growth. The results are not consistent with either a standard Ramsey model or with
a variation of this model that incorporates time-inconsistent preferences. To explain a large
di¤erence in outcomes between cash and in-kind grants, we need a model with a lack of asset
integration where the form in which capital comes a¤ects the extent to which it is invested in
the business. We examine two possible causes of the di¤erence between in-kind and cash grants:
self-control issues caused by time-inconsistent preferences, high discount rates, or lack of ability
to save; and external pressure from others to share additional resources. We nd that the e¤ect
of the cash treatment is signicantly more positive for individuals with the most self-control,
whereas there is no evidence of treatment heterogeneity with respect to external pressure. This
is consistent with the recent evidence in Spears (2009) who suggests that present-bias is a key
constraint on microentrepreneurs expanding their businesses. But it contradicts results from
Anderson and Baland (2002) for Kenya and Somville (2011) for Benin, whose evidence suggests
that women seek to save outside the household in order to avoid contributing to household ex-
penses, and ndings by Brune et al. (2011) in Malawi, who argue that the reason for the success
of a saving commitment product is the desire to escape external pressure.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we present the conceptual
framework and testing strategy. Section 3 describes the experimental design and characteristics
of our sample. Section 4 gives the basic experimental results, and explores heterogeneity by
gender, treatment type, and randomization strata. Section 5 then asks what happens to the
cash grants and what distinguishes the protable from less protable female businesses. Section
6 examines why the cash and in-kind treatments di¤er, and Section 7 concludes.
2 Conceptual framework and testing strategy
In this section we present a conceptual framework that guides our empirical analysis. The model
is organized around two key assumptions which characterize the population of microenterprises
we study: entrepreneurs cannot borrow and have to self nance (only 10 percent of our sample
has ever had a formal loan); and they have di¤erent abilities and ability is a complement to
capital. We rst present a model of capital accumulation without time inconsistency and derive
testable predictions regarding the e¤ect of a capital grant. We then introduce time consistency
4
and self-control issues and discuss how experimental predictions are a¤ected. Next we discuss
asset integration and intra-household issues. The testing strategy is presented at the end.
2.1 The Ramsey model
Consider an entrepreneur facing a standard accumulation problem of the form:
max
ct>0;kt0;wt0
1X
t=0
tu(ct) subject to
ct = (kt; ) + rwt   (kt+1   kt)  (wt+1   wt) (1)
where k is capital invested in a business with total return to capital (k; ), variable  is individ-
ual specic talent,  is the discount factor, and w is a nancial asset with return r.4 We assume
@=@k  0 (positive or zero returns to capital) but @2=@k2 < 0 (decreasing returns to scale).
Decreasing returns to scale may be due to the presence of xed factors, such as entrepreneur
time and family labor. We also assume that @2=@k@ > 0: more talented entrepreneurs have
higher marginal returns to capital.5
There are two possible treatments: a cash transfer Mt and an in-kind transfer Et at an
arbitrary time t. Both can be turned into more capital k but it takes time to liquidate grant
Et that comes in the form of equipment or inventories. In contrast, Mt is liquid and perfectly
fungible with k or w or c. We derive model predictions about @k=@M and @k=@E.
We rst note that, by asset arbitrage, wt = 0 if 0t(k; ) > r. In this case, the rst order
conditions are as follows:
tu0t = t
t(1 + 
0
t) = t 1
where 0 denotes the marginal return to capital and t is the Lagrange multiplier associated
with the constraint. From the above we get a standard Euler equation of the form:
1 + 0t(k; ) =
1

 u
0
t 1
u0t
4Variable (k; ) measures value added, that is, return to capital and family labor net of intermediate input
costs and other recurrent costs. Given the nature of the studied rms, this corresponds to an accounting notion
of prot, but not to an economic notion of prot/return to capital since we have not imputed the cost of the
entrepreneurs labor.
5 It is conceivable that a minimum level of capital is needed to initiate a business. Since all households in our
sample by construction have a business, we ignore this here.
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If we ignore savings wt, there exists a steady state level of capital k such that prot  and
consumption c are constant and:
0(k; ) = 
where   1  . The proof follows from the fact that, without savings wt, the above is a standard
Ramsey model. Given that @2=@k2 < 0 it follows that dk=d > 0 more patient entrepreneurs
have larger k.
If r > , the entrepreneur stops investing in the rm once the marginal return to capital
falls below r, and invests in w instead. The optimal rm size is then given by:
0(k; ) = r
with k < k. Given our assumption that, @2=@k@ > 0 comparative statics imply that both
dk=d > 0 and dk=d > 0 more talented entrepreneurs have larger steady state capital and
rm size. Only patient agents  that is, those with  < r  ever hold non-zero savings, wt > 0.
If kt < minfk; kg, the cash and in-kind treatments are predicted to increase capital and
prots by the same amount.6 Their long term e¤ect is to shorten the time necessary to reach the
steady state rm size. In contrast, when a entrepreneur has reached k or k, the e¤ect of the
two treatments is di¤erent. If k = k, a cash transfer has no e¤ect on capital and @kt+s=@Mt
= 0 for any s  0; it raises consumption c and savings w instead. In this case we should observe
no cash treatment e¤ect on prots t+s(k; ): the cash treatment Mt should not be invested in
rms that have already reached their optimal size; it should be saved instead. If the in-kind
treatment Et cannot be liquidated immediately, however, we expect a temporary positive e¤ect
on prot: (k + E; ) > (k; ) since, by assumption, @=@k  0. But this e¤ect should be
short-lived: the rm should return to its steady state capital level as soon as E can be divested.
If k = k with  > r, then instead of saving in asset w in order to smooth consumption of the
capital grant, it is optimal for the entrepreneur to use a temporary investment in the rm as
bu¤er to smooth consumption. In this case, Mt and Et have a similar short-run e¤ect on capital
and prots.
In all cases the model predicts that the cash and in-kind treatments will result in higher
consumption. In the steady state case with  > r, the household is impatient and the treatment
will be consumed rapidly before consumption returns to its steady state level. In the case where
6 In the interest of space, we do not discuss the case where kt+M > minfk; kg > kt. This case is e¤ectively
a weighted average of the two cases we describe.
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r > , there will be more smoothing, that is, part of the treatment will be saved and consumed
later. In the case where kt is below its steady state, we expect an increase in consumption out
of higher prots.
2.2 Time-inconsistent preferences
We now introduce quasi-hyperbolic preferences as in Laibson (1997). At time t the household
sets kt so as to solve:
max
fcs;ws;ksg
u(ct) + 
1X
s=t+1
su(cs) subject to (1) (2)
where  < 1. But once at time t+ 1, the household sets kt+1 according to:
max
fcs+1;ws+1;ks+1g
u(ct+1) + 
1X
s=t+2
su(cs) subject to (1): (3)
This means that at time t + 1 the household wants to revisit decisions taken at time t and set
paths for fct+1; ct+2; :::wt+1; wt+2; :::; kt+1; kt+2; :::g that di¤er from those set in period t.
In Appendix 1 we show that the entrepreneur stops investing after reaching a steady state
level of capital ks (for a sophisticate) or km (for a myopic decision maker) which are, in general,
smaller than k. Model predictions regarding the e¤ect of a capital grant are similar to the
Ramsey model. If the rm has already reached its steady state ks or km, the cash transfer M
will be rapidly consumed while the in-kind grant E will be divested as quickly as is feasible.
If kt < ks or km, then the additional cash M or inventories E will remain in the business and
increase future prots.
To summarize, the standard and time inconsistent models both predict that the long-term
e¤ect of the cash and in-kind transfers on capital and prot are nil for rms that have already
reached their steady state capital level. The short-term e¤ect of the cash transfer on capital
and prot is also nil. For the in-kind treatment there is a short-term increase in capital and
prot until the household is able to divest, which is expected to happen as soon as is feasible. In
contrast, for rms that are below steady state, both cash and in-kind transfers are predicted to
be entirely invested and the e¤ect of the grant is to reduce the time taken to reach the optimal
rm size.
2.3 Asset non-integration and family pressure
In the experiment most in-kind grants are used to purchase inventories and raw materials rather
than machinery (and rm owners could chose which of these it was). It should therefore be
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relatively easy to de-capitalize these grants (by selling and not replacing stock) and take them
out of the business. This di¤ers from the conditionality on school attendance or vaccination in
traditional conditional cash transfers, which are not reversible. We should therefore think of the
di¤erence between cash and in-kind treatments as earmarking the grant for a specic purpose
and reducing its liquidity. Given that inventory turnover is quite rapid in the kind of enterprises
covered by this study  e.g., one week  the reduction in liquidity is minimal. Based on the
models discussed so far, we should therefore expect little di¤erence between cash and in-kind
treatments.
Until now we have assumed that people make decisions regarding asset accumulation in an
integrated manner, i.e., that consumption c, prots , capital k and savings w are regarded as
fungible. Yet experimental evidence suggests that asset integration often fails. For instance,
it is common for experimental participants to exhibit considerable risk aversion even though
the stakes are very small stakes relative to their wealth (Harrison, Lau and Rutstrom 2007;
Andersen, Harrison, Lau and Rutstrom 2008). Similarly, Camerer, Babcock, Loewenstein and
Thaler (1997) nd that cab drivers make labor supply decisions based on single-day earnings.
In other words, they fail to integrate earnings over a longer time period of a week or a month
when making enterprise decisions.
Self-control issues arising from dynamic inconsistencies in preferences are one reason people
may not undertake productive activities today that have large payo¤s in the future. For example,
Duo et al. (2010) nd farmers in Kenya fail to undertake protable investments in fertilizer
due to present-bias, but that o¤ering small time-limited discounts can induce them to do so.
Banerjee and Mullainathan (2010) show that these time-inconsistency issues can be particularly
important for the poor. Given this, in-kind grants may then act as a nudgeto get rm owners
to invest in their business, and once the money is in inventories and equipment, limited illiquidity
may help the rm owner avoid impulse purchases.
Asset integration may also fail for reasons external to the individual, such as disagreement
over the allocation of resources between household or family members. If intra-household bar-
gaining is e¢ cient, asset integration should hold. But if binding commitment is not possible, for
instance because of lack of trust, intra-household allocation of resources can be ine¢ cient. Udry
(1996), for instance, shows that organic fertilizer is not allocated e¢ ciently between male and
female elds in Burkina Faso. Anderson and Baland (2002) similarly show that women in ur-
ban Kenya join rotating savings and credit associations (ROSCAs) to shelter money away from
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their spouse. A similar result is reported by Somville (2011) for Benin. de Mel et al. (2009a)
suggest women may ine¢ ciently over-invest in less liquid forms of business assets in order to
resist spousal pressure.
Pressure to redistribute resources can also be exerted from outside the household. Platteau
(2000) introduces the idea of sharing norms to economics from anthropology. He notes that
in many developing countries, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, individuals often live in large
households and have strong links to extended family and kinship networks. Social sharing
norms can make it hard for individuals to save and invest, as they are forced to share additional
resources with others. These sharing norms can vary according to the source of income and how
it is stored. For example, Duo and Udry (2004) nd evidence that the proceeds of di¤erent
crops are used for di¤erent purposes in Côte dIvoire, and note that income from some crops
is expected to be shared within the household and income from others is not. Charlier (1999),
based on work in Côte dIvoire, notes that as a result of sharing norms, individuals may develop
an illiquidity preference in order to be able to resist social claims without appearing selsh.
Suggestive evidence supporting this view comes from di Falco and Bulte (2009), who show in
South Africa that households with more kinship links spend less of their income on liquid and
sharable assets, and from Baland, Guirkinger and Mali (2007), who nd individuals in Cameroon
taking loans even though they have high savings balances, which their interviews reveal to be a
way of resisting demands for nancial assistance by others. Jakiela and Ozier (2011) nd in a
lab experiment in rural Kenya that women invest less when the income they earn is observable
to relatives, even when this reduces their expected total earnings. However, Grimm et al. (2010)
o¤er a more mixed picture, nding in seven West-African countries that local social networks
within the city actually have a positive association with business performance, whereas there
is a negative association between business performance and a smaller distance to the village of
origin.
In our context the existence of a social solidarity tax, either from other household members
or from extended family members, may lead to less of the cash grant being invested in the
business than is the case with the in-kind grant. This could arise either due to the di¤erence
in liquidity (it takes some time to decapitalize inventories and raw materials and this time is
su¢ cient to resist pressure for on-the-spot transfers) or to the di¤erence in form and function
(there could be an expectation to share cash coming into the household, but not to share the
value of additional materials going into the business).
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To capture these ideas, let us rewrite the law of motion of entrepreneurial capital as:
kt+1 = kt + (kt; )  ht (4)
where ht  ct + wt+1   (1 + r)wt represents what is taken out of the enterprise either to be
consumed or to be invested in other assets. In the Ramsey and time inconsistent models 
hereafter RTI models the optimal choices of consumption ct and savings wt+1 depend on total
cash-in-hand kt + (kt; ) + (1 + r)wt. Unless kt is illiquid, increasing kt or t has the same
e¤ect on cash-in-hand and thus on ht, kt+1 and t+1. In the more general case, ht = h(t; kt)
and asset integration requires that h(t; kt) = h(t + kt). If households regard kt and t as
not fungible, they are imperfect substitutes in h(kt; t) and h(t; kt) 6= h(t + kt). This simple
observation forms the basis for our testing strategy.
As discussed earlier, asset integration may fail because assets kt are less susceptible to internal
pressure than prots t. Turning working capital into inventories or equipment may serve as
self-commitment device against the temptation of impulse purchases. This is akin to consumers
putting money on a low-yield savings account that is less conveniently accessible. In the same
vein, Fafchamps, Udry, and Czukas (1998) present evidence suggesting that, in times of duress,
farming households prefer to reduce consumption than sell animals because the latter would
translate into lower income in the future.
The other possibility is that pressure from household members and other relatives works as
a tax on the business with @h@ >
@h
@k  0. Money tied up in inventories or equipment is less
liquid and thus partly insulated from external pressure. If successful, this tactic would yield a
marginal tax rate on cash ow @h@ that is higher than the marginal tax on capital
@h
@k . If asset
non-integration signals an e¤ort to escape taxation of this kind, it is more likely to be observed
among enterprises operated by more subordinate household members, such as married women.
When asset integration fails, cash and in-kind treatments can have systematically di¤erent
e¤ects: the in-kind transfer may be treated as adding to the rms capital, while the cash
treatment is regarded as part of the rms cash ow, or as never having entered the rm in the
rst place. To illustrate, consider the simple case where @h@k = 0 but
@h
@ > 0. A steady state rm
10
size kv is dened as a capital stock that satises:7
(kv; ) = h((kv; )):
To x ideas, suppose that ht = at + b with 0 < a < 1. The law of motion of capital becomes:
kt+1 = kt + (1  a)(kt; )  b (5)
which resembles a Solow model with a negative drift term b. Provided that the marginal return
to capital is high enough at low values of k,8 di¤erence equation (5) has two equilibria: a high,
stable equilibrium kvhigh similar to the steady state of a Solow model; and an low, unstable
equilibrium kvlow below which the rm closes down. For k such that k
v
low < kt < k
v
high, the rm
is growing. For k < kvlow, the rm is unstable and eventually disappears and is thus unlikely
to be part of our sample.
We now introduce cash and in-kind grants. Equation (5) is rewritten:
kt+1 = kt + Et + (1  a)((kt; ) +Mt)  b
which implies that for initial values of k such that kvlow < kt < k
v
high, the in-kind treatment Et
has a one-for-one e¤ect on capital stock kt+1 but the cash treatment only has a 1  a e¤ect on
kt+1:
dkt
dEt
= 1 > 1  a = dkt
dMt
where the notation kt denotes kt+1   kt. In other words the cash treatment is predicted to
have a lower e¤ect on future capital and hence prots than the in-kind treatment as long as
a > 0, that is, as long as @h@ > 0.
Turning to long-term predictions, if the rm was below its equilibrium size kvhigh, the in-kind
treatment speeds up convergence to the steady state kvhigh. Future additional prots generated
by kt + Et are subject to taxation and raise future consumption. If the rm was at or above
equilibrium size kvhigh, then decreasing returns in capital imply (kt; )  ht < 0 and the rm
should slowly decapitalize the in-kind treatment Et. In the special case where h() = b and
initial capital kt < kvlow but kt + Et + (1   a)(kt; )   b > kv, the in-kind treatment pushes
7For some functions h(), the steady state is not stable. For instance, if h() = b with b a positive constant,
the steady state kv is given by (kv; ) = b, but the rm eventually closes down if kt < kv while it expands forever
for kt > kv. In contrast, if h() = , the law of motion of capital becomes kt+1 = kt and any capital level k is an
equilibrium.
8A standard Inada condition.
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the rm above the minimal threshold size and ensures its long term survival.9 In the special
case where h() = , the in-kind treatment pushes the rm to a new equilibrium level of capital
kt + Et: future prots increase but there is no further addition or subtraction to capital after
t+ 1.
The above example can be generalized to allow ht to depend on both t and kt. For instance,
let ht = at+ kt+ b with and 0 <  < 1. The no-closure stable steady state kw is the (highest)
value of k that solves:10
(1  a)(kw; )  b = kw:
It follows that equilibrium rm size is a decreasing function of both a and . The in-kind
treatment has a 1    e¤ect on kt+1 while the cash treatment has a 1   a, also less-than-one-
for-one, e¤ect on kt+1. Asset integration requires that a = . If investing in inventories and
equipment is successful as protecting the capital of the enterprise, we should observe a > .
This forms the basis of our testing strategy.
2.4 Testing strategy
We estimate models of the form:
i;t+s = 1Mit + 2Eit + ui;t+s (6)
ki;t+s = 1Mit + 2Eit + vi;t+s (7)
where t is the time of treatment, i;t+s is the prot of entrepreneur i at time t+s after treatment,
ki;t+s is the capital stock, and ui;t+s and vi;t+s are error terms. Coe¢ cients s and s are the
average e¤ects of each of the two treatments on capital stock and prots, respectively, across
the population of rms in our sample.
The RTI models predict 1 = 2 > 0 and 1 = 2 > 0 if the rm was below its steady state
at the time of the treatment. They also predict 1 = 1 = 0 if the rm had already reached
its equilibrium size at time t such that kt = k; km, or ks. Because the in-kind treatment is
not immediately fungible, these models also predict 2 > 0 and 2 > 0 for a small time from
9 In this case, the treatment eliminates a poverty trap.
10 If b = 0, this is a Solow model in disguise. If we set (k; ) = ke, the steady state is the usual:
kw =

1  a

e
 1
1 
where 1  a is the savings rate and  plays the role of depreciation.
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treatment s, but eventually 2 = 2 = 0 for s large enough, as k returns to its steady state
from above. A similar result obtains if kt = k and rm capital is used as bu¤er to smooth
consumption.
In contrast, the model without asset integration makes predictions that do not in general
depend on whether the rm is above or below steady state kvhigh. Predictions however depends
on the form taken by the external pressure function h(:). If ht is a constant lumpsum b with
a =  = 0, then both treatments Mt and Et increase capital one for one, that is, 1 = 2 = 1 at
time s = t + 1, that is, one period after treatment. If, in contrast, ht = t and Mt is regarded
as part of the rms cash ow t but Et is not, then 1 = 0 and 2 = 1 at all s  t+ 1.
For the intermediate case where ht = at + b with a < 1, the model predicts that Et has a
one-for-one e¤ect on capital stock kt+1, that is, that 2 = 1 butMt only has a 1 a e¤ect on kt+1,
i.e., 0 < 1 = 1  a < 1. The larger a is, the closer 1 is to 0. Finally, when ht = at + kt + b,
that is, when external pressure also puts a tax on capital, then 0 < 2 = 1   < 1 while we still
have 0 < 1 = 1  a < 1. Asset integration requires that 1 = 2 and hence that 1 = 2.
We have discussed two main reasons why household asset integration may fail: internal
pressure driven by self-commitment problems; and external pressure from household and family
members. If external pressure comes primarily from husbands, unmarried women should show
a lower a and  and thus a stronger response to treatment. If pressure comes from children
or the extended family, a stronger response to treatment will be observed for entrepreneurs
without children or with a smaller extended family. To implement this idea, let a = a0 + a1z
and  = 0+ 1z with z a vector of proxies for di¤erent kinds of external pressure. We estimate
a model of the form:
i;t+s = (1  a)Mit + (1  )Eit + vi;t+s
= (1  a0)Mit   a1Mitzi + (1  0)Eit   1Eitzi + vi;t+s (8)
If a specic element of zi is associated with a higher implicit tax rate on cash ow, then the
coe¢ cient of Mitzi should be negative and signicant. Similarly, if it is associated with higher
taxation of capital, the coe¢ cient of Eitzi should be negative and signicant.
We test internal pressure using a similar approach. In this case, pressure comes from the
non-business minded self, that is, the self susceptible to immediate gratication. In this context,
keeping excess liquidity in less fungible inventories and equipment can be seen as a way to
insulate working capital from temptation. If this strategy is successful, we should observe that
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1 < a1 for individuals with more self-commitment problems proxied by zi.
3 The Experiment
3.1 The Sample
We purposively chose urban Ghana as the setting for this study. The choice of Ghana was
motivated by the desire to provide evidence in an African context, in a country known for a
history of involvement of women in business which provides a setting that is conducive to female
business success. Women in Ghana have similar labor force participation rates to men, and
are more likely to be self-employed. Evidence of this is seen in data from the 2000 Ghanaian
Census: the labor-force participation rates for 15-60 year olds are 69.6 percent for females and
73.9 percent for males, and in urban areas 45 percent of females are non-agricultural own-account
workers, compared to 33 percent of males. This contrasts sharply with Sri Lanka, the setting
for the experiment in de Mel et al. (2009a), where only 7.8 percent of prime age females are
self-employed, compared to 29.7 percent of prime age males.
Within Ghana we chose Accra, the capital and largest city, and the nearby industrial city
of Tema. A sample of microenterprises (which we term the Ghana Microenterprise Survey)
was then constructed as follows. First, enumeration areas (EAs) were selected with probability
proportional to the number of households in these EAs according to the 2000 census. We
randomly selected 70 EAs in Accra and 30 in Tema. Then, to reduce the costs of listing, we
subdivided EAs into equal areas, such that each area would contain approximately 70 to 80
households. This typically required dividing an EA into half or thirds. One of these areas was
then randomly selected from each EA. Enumerators went door to door in this area to carry
out a screening survey of each household. Households were screened to identify those with an
individual age 20 to 55 who was self-employed and working 30 or more hours per week in a
business with no paid employees and no motorized vehicle. These criteria were used to select
full-time microenterprise owners who were not so large that the grants in our experiment would
have little e¤ect.
The gender and business sector of all individuals passing this screen were then recorded. This
resulted in screening 7,567 households to identify 3,907 individuals who passed the screen. Only
19.4 percent of these individuals were male, conrming the predominance of women among
small enterprise owners in urban Ghana. Based on the gender mix of self-employed in these
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industries in the 2000 Census, we classied business sectors into male-dominated industries,
identied as construction, repair services, manufacturing, and shoe making and repair; female-
dominated industries, identied as hair and beauty care, and food and restaurant sales; and
mixed industries, identied as trade and retail, and sewing and tailoring. These industries cover
the vast majority of the industries in which the self-employed work in Ghana. The 4.6 percent
of those screened who worked in other industries such as communication services, pharmacy,
photography, shing, and agriculture were not included in the sample.
Our aim was then to arrive at a sample of roughly 900 baseline rms stratied by gender
and sector. In order to minimize the spillovers from the treatments to be carried out, we limited
the sample from each EA to no more than 5 males in male-dominated and 5 males in mixed
industries, and no more than 3 females in female-dominated and 3 females in mixed industries.
We also ensured that only one individual was chosen from any given household. This resulted
in an initial sample of 907 rms, consisting of 538 females and 369 males. A baseline survey
of these rms was conducted in October and November 2008. The rm owners were asked for
details of both their rm and their household.
A second pre-treatment survey of these rms was conducted in February 2009. The purpose
of a second pre-treatment round was to eliminate rms most likely to attrit. In particular, 55 of
the initial 907 rms could not be found on at least three attempts, 15 rm owners refused this
second round, 24 rm owners were no longer operating a business, and 20 rms that did not
provide details on their rm prots, expenses and sales were eliminated. This left a nal sample
for the experiment of 793 rms, comprising 479 females (248 in female-dominated industries and
231 in mixed industries) and 314 males (146 in male-dominated industries and 168 in mixed
industries).
3.2 Experimental design
The design of the experiment closely followed that used in Sri Lanka by de Mel et al. (2008,
2009a). Firms which completed the rst two survey rounds were randomly allocated into three
groups: a control group of 396 rms, a treatment group of 198 rms which would receive 150
Ghanaian cedis (approximately US$120 at the time of the baseline) in cash which they could use
for any purpose, and a treatment group of 198 rms which would receive 150 cedis in equipment,
materials, or inventories for their business. In the case of the in-kind treatment, the equipment
or materials were selected by the rm owner and purchased directly by our research assistants
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with the owner.
The majority of this was in the form of inventories to sell (e.g. beauty care products,
electronic goods, alcohol, food) and raw materials (e.g. wood, sandpaper, cloth, oil and other
cooking ingredients, shampoos and supplies for beauty salon use). Only 24 percent of those
receiving the in-kind treatment elected to buy physical equipment, with the most common
equipment purchased being sewing and knitting machines by tailors, hair dryers by owners of
beauty salons, and drills and other carpentry equipment by rms in woodwork. Males were more
likely to get some equipment with this treatment than females (33 percent versus 19 percent).
With the cash treatments, rm owners were notied by phone, or in-person, and then received
the cash through money transfer at a local bank or in-person.
We also randomly selected when rms would receive their grant, staggering the timing of the
grants, so that 198 rms were assigned to receive the grants after the second round, a further
181 rms assigned to receive the grants after the third round, and 18 rms were assigned to
receive the grants after the fourth round. This staggering was done both for the purpose of
managing the logistics of making these grants, and to provide incentives for rms to remain in
the study for multiple rounds since they were told more grants would be given out after rounds
3 and 4. These grants were framed to rms as prizes to thank rms for participating in the
survey. Participants in the survey were told that we were undertaking a study of small rms in
Ghana, and that some of the rms would be randomly chosen to receive prizes as a token of our
appreciation for their participation in the survey. Firms which were selected in either treatment
group were not told they had been selected for a prize until the time their prize was being given
out.
Randomization was done via computer after the second round of data was collected. Firms
were rst stratied into 16 strata on the basis of gender and sector (males in male dominated
industries, males in mixed industries, females in female-dominated industries, and females in
mixed industries); baseline capital stock (above or below the raw baseline median of 181 cedis in
capital stock); and on a binary variable called high capture. In the second survey round, rm
owners were asked on a 5 point Likert scale (ranging from 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly
agree) to assess how strongly they agreed or disagreed with the statements Whenever I have
money on hand, my spouse or other family members always end up requesting some of it, and
People who do well in their business here are likely to receive additional requests from family
and friends for money to help out with some expense or another. We summed the responses
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to these two questions, and classied as high capturerm owners with scores of the median
of 8 or above that is if on average they agree with both statements.
Then within each strata, we ranked rms according to January 2009 reported prots (col-
lected in the second round survey), and formed matched quadruplets of rms. We used wave 2
rather than baseline prots for the match since 9 percent of the rms did not report round 1
prots. Within the quadruplet one rm was then randomly chosen to receive the cash treatment,
one to receive the in-kind treatment, and two to be control rms. We then randomly selected
which quadruplets would receive their treatments after each round. In the end this resulted in
the 793 rms being matched into 195 groups, of which 4 groups ranged in size from 5 to 8 rms
and the remainder were quadruplets.
This randomization design was based on the analysis in Bruhn and McKenzie (2009) who
showed the potential for signicant increases in power and baseline balance from matched pairs
(with a single treatment group) and stratication compared to simple randomization. The
variables used for stratication were motivated by the results in de Mel et al. (2009a). In
particular, we stratied by gender and industry since the ex post heterogeneity analysis in
that paper found strong di¤erences by gender, and some suggestion of di¤erences according
to whether women were working in female-dominated versus mixed industries. The choice of
high capture as a stratifying variable is motivated by the literature referenced earlier that
has suggested that many individuals who succeed in raising their incomes face large demands to
share it from others. In addition, there was some evidence in Sri Lanka that a reason for the low
returns to women is pressure from household members to redistribute resources. Stratication
on baseline capital stock was done both because this was believed to be a variable which would
be correlated with future prots, and to allow for testing potential heterogeneity in treatment
e¤ects for smaller and larger microenterprises. Matching of quadruplets on prots was done to
achieve greater balance on the pre-treatment value of the main outcome of interest as well as to
investigate treatment heterogeneity in this dimension. It also enables us to eliminate quadruplets
with outlier values of pre-treatment prots and still be assured of balance and random allocation
to treatments and control among the remaining sample.
3.3 Data collection and description of rms
The two pre-treatment survey rounds were followed up by four additional survey waves in May
2009, August 2009, November 2009, and February 2010. Of the 793 rms which completed the
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rst two rounds, 730 answered the nal wave survey. Appendix 1 details wave by wave attrition
rates and shows the robustness of our main treatment e¤ects to corrections for attrition.
Each follow-up round collected data on changes over the quarter in xed capital from pur-
chases, sales or repair; the current value of inventories and raw materials, and the value of the
last months expenses, sales, and prots. The most important rm outcome variable measured
is rm prots. Prots were elicited via a direct question, following the recommendations of de
Mel et al. (2009b). Firm owners were asked: After paying all expenses, what was the income
of the business (the prots) during January 2009? (Consider all expenses, including wages of
employees but not including any income you paid yourself as an expense). This denition
of prot thus includes the return to the entrepreneurs labor and managerial talent. Nominal
prots were converted to October 2008 real prots using the Greater Accra region Consumer
Price Index collected by the Ghana Statistical Service.
An innovation in this experiment was the use of computerized cross-sectional and panel
consistency checks. Data was collected using PDAs, and a consistency check was triggered
whenever reported prots exceeded reported sales in the cross-section, whenever a rm reported
sales but not prots, and whenever the change in prots from one quarter to the next was less
than -33.3 percent or greater than +50 percent (provided the absolute change in prots was at
least 20 cedis). We discuss these consistency checks in more detail in Fafchamps et al. (2010),
where we show that they lead to some improvements in data quality. We therefore use the prots
which incorporate the consistency checks in this paper. Nonetheless, our results are similar when
we use the raw prot data.
Table 1 summarizes the basic characteristics of rms and their owners in our experimental
sample, and compares the pre-treatment characteristics of rms in the control group to those
assigned to either treatment group. The top of the table shows balance for the characteristics
used for stratication or matching, while the remaining rows compare the characteristics of other
variables of interest. Mean (median) monthly prots in January 2009 were 130 (68) cedis, and
mean (median) capital stock at the same point in time was 452 (172) cedis. The grants of 150
cedis were therefore approximately equivalent to two monthsprots and almost equal to the
size of existing capital stock for the median rm. However, since we did not explicitly cap prots
or capital stock when selecting rms into the experimental sample, there are a small number of
rms with much higher levels the maximum prot reported in our pre-treatment waves is over
5000 cedis per month. The inclusion of these few larger rms does not have much e¤ect our
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basic results, but has a larger e¤ect on our analysis of treatment heterogeneity. As discussed
below, we therefore focus most of our analysis involving heterogeneity of treatment response
on the rms in quadruplets which have baseline prots of 1500 cedis per month or less. Since
randomization occurred within quadruplets, balance on baseline characteristics is achieved for
this subsample also.
Table 1 shows that overall the two treatment groups look similar to the control group in
terms of pre-treatment characteristics. The exceptions are October/November 2008 prots and
January 2009 sales, which show signicant di¤erences across treatment groups in the trimmed
sample, and di¤erences in magnitude, if not statistical signicance, in the full sample. Recall
the matched randomization used the wave 2 prots. However, the correlation between wave 1
and wave 2 prots is only 0.19, compared to a correlation of 0.58 between wave 2 and wave 3
prots, and of 0.72 for the control group between waves 5 and 6 (which is the same seasonality
as between waves 1 and 2). This di¤erence in baseline prots is due to pure chance, and is in a
variable which the data suggests involves considerable noise and perhaps learning on the part of
survey respondents as well. Imbalance on this baseline prot measure is thus unlikely to imply
imbalance on follow-up prots, particularly given the pre-treatment balance on wave 2 prots
(Bruhn and McKenzie, 2009). Nevertheless, we will show our results are largely robust to the
use of rm xed e¤ects which account for any baseline imbalances, the main di¤erence being in
the cash-treatment for males, which we discuss in detail later.
As seen in Table 1, the mean owner in our sample is 36 years old, has almost 9 years of
schooling, and has been running the rm for 7 years. The mean number of digits recalled in
a Digitspan recall test is 5.1, which is almost one digit lower than the 5.9 average among Sri
Lankan microenterprise owners (de Mel et al, 2008). The majority of rms are run out of the
home, with 83 percent of women and 69 percent of men operating a business from their dwelling.
Most rms are informal, with only 14 percent registered for taxes, and only 10 percent have ever
had a loan from a bank or micronance institution. Half of the rm owners use a susu collector,
with this more common among women (58 percent) than men (34 percent). A susu collector is
an informal mobile banker, who typically collects a savings deposit daily from individuals and
returns them at the end of the month after subtracting one days deposit as a fee. That is,
saving is at negative interest rates in exchange for safekeeping. Besley (1995, p. 2150) states
that a frequently heard rationale for the existence of this institution is that there are di¢ culties
for those who have a stock of liquid assets in resisting the claims of their friends and relatives
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(or even spouses).
4 Testing the predictive power of the models
Before investigating the e¤ect of the randomized capital grants on sample rms, we briey
examine the baseline data for evidence consistent with predictions made by the models presented
in Section 2. The evidence we o¤er is non-experimental, but since we are not trying to draw
causal inference, observational data remains useful.
The Ramsey model predicts, other things being equal, that more patient entrepreneurs have
a higher steady state capital stock. More talented entrepreneurs should also have larger rms
and thus larger capital stock. The time inconsistency model further predicts that entrepreneurs
that are more hyperbolic in their discounting should also have a lower steady state capital stock.
We investigate these predictions using the baseline capital stock of all respondents. The
results are shown on Table 2. Consistent with the predictions of the model, we nd some
evidence that more able entrepreneurs have larger capital stocks. The regression in column 1
shows that years of schooling, results from a Raven test of non-verbal reasoning, and results
from a forward digitspan test all have positive measured e¤ects, though only the digitspan score
is statistically signicant.
The column 1 regression also includes measures of the owners short-term discount rate and
an indication of hyperbolic attitudes. Hyperbolicity is proxied by answers to questions asked in
the baseline survey involving discount rates over the two di¤erent time horizons, and patience
is measured by whether a respondent has a discount rate above or below the sample median.
Firm owners were asked hypothetical questions to elicit the amounts that would leave them
indi¤erent between an amount today, and 100 cedis in one month; and between an amount in
ve months and 100 cedis in six months. From this we construct two proxies: an indicator
variable of whether the respondent has a discount rate above the median for the one month
versus today comparison (the median person would take 90 today instead of 100 in one month);
and an indicator of being a hyperbolic discounter based on comparison of discount rates over
the two horizons (28 percent of the sample are classied as hyperbolic). We nd that hyperbolic
discounters have signicantly smaller businesses, consistent with the theory. Those with below
median one month discount rates have insignicantly larger businesses.
Our surveys include two additional measures which each measures of self-control and the
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ability to save cash, both of which were measured pre-treatment. These refer to actual saving
behavior as reported by respondents before treatment. The rst is whether the respondent used a
susu collector; the second, whether the respondent agrees or strongly agrees with the statement
I save regularly (which two-thirds of respondents do). We use the principal component of
these and the two discount rate measures to create an index measuring a lack of self-control.
The regression in column 2 uses the index of self control in place of the discount rate measures.
Those with less self control have lower baseline capital stocks.
The models also predict that individuals who are more patient and less hyperbolic should
save more and grow their business faster as long as they are they below their optimal size.
Conditional on the log of baseline capital, we do nd that the growth in capital stock between
wave 1 and 2 (i.e., before treatment) is faster for respondents who are more patient and are not
hyperbolic. All these results tally with the predictions of the RTI models.
Finally, in column 3 we include a dummy for high pressure to share within the household.
This variable plays in principle no role in the RTI models, but we nd that this is also associated
with signicantly smaller capital stock at baseline. This is consistent with the idea to pressure
to share a¤ects rm size, and suggests that factors other than those in the basic RTI framework
may have important e¤ects on rm size.
All three regressions include controls for the age of the owner, and the education level of
the owners mother and father. The models also predict that, other things being equal, older
entrepreneurs are likely to have larger rms because they have had more time to accumulate and
learn, and thus reach their long-term steady state. The data support this. Parental education is
added as a control variable for initial household wealth and socioeconomic status. The regressions
also include an indicator that the owners is female. We nd that female-owned businesses are
signicantly smaller in terms of baseline capital stock.
In sum, the regressions on Table 2 suggest that baseline capital stocks are consistent with
several of the predictions made by the RTI model. The signicance of pressure to share with
others in the household suggests that factors outside the RTI framework may also be important.
We now turn to the experimental data to investigate whether exogenous shocks to household
capital are invested in ways which are consistent with model predictions.
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5 Estimation of Experimental Treatment E¤ects
Only 9 rm owners assigned to receive a grant (2% of those assigned to treatment) did not
receive one. One of these rm owners had died, three women refused the grant saying their
husbands would not let them accept it, and the other ve rms had attrited from the survey
and could not be located to give them the grant. Given this, we focus on intent-to-treat e¤ects,
which show the impact of being randomly assigned to receive the grant in practice there is little
di¤erence between the intent-to-treat e¤ect and the treatment on the treated e¤ect of actually
receiving the grant given that compliance is almost 100%.
5.1 Impact on Prots by Grant Type and Gender
Figures 1 and 2 graphically show the main results of the experiment by displaying the empirical
cumulative distribution functions (CDFs) of real prots by gender and treatment group for
the nal two rounds of the survey. For males, Figure 1 shows that both the in-kind and cash
treatments have distributions to the right of the control distribution, with separation over most
of the range of prots. The in-kind and cash treatments have similar distributions up to about
the 80th percentile, and then separate with the distribution of prots for the in-kind treatment
lying to the right of the cash treatment prots distribution. In contrast, the distribution of
real prots by treatment group for females shows two noticeable di¤erences from that of males.
First, the distribution of the cash treatment group lies right on top of that of the control group,
suggesting no impact of the cash treatment on prots. Second, while the in-kind distribution
lies to the right of the other two groups, this separation only occurs at about the 50th or 60th
percentile. That is, for women, the in-kind treatment seems to have had an e¤ect only for the
top half of the distribution.
We then estimate the average impact of the cash and in-kind grants on rm prots. We
begin by pooling together male and female business owners, and running an OLS regression of
the form:
i;t+s = 1Mit + 2Eit +
X
t
tDit +
GX
g=1
gSig + "i;t+s (9)
where Mit and Eit are dummy variables indicating whether rm i has been assigned to receive
either the cash or in-kind treatment by time t. The error term uit has been decomposed into
wave xed e¤ects Dit, quadruplet xed e¤ects Sig, and a residual "it. The G quadruplets are
the strata used in the randomization of the two treatments across entrepreneurs (see Section
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3.2) and are included following the recommendation of Bruhn and McKenzie (2009).
We test whether either treatment is signicantly di¤erent from zero. We also test the equality
of e¤ects of the two treatments 1 = 2. We estimate equation (9) for the full sample, and then
for the sub-sample which trims out matched quadruplets which have a rm with pre-treatment
prots above 1500 cedis.11 In addition to OLS estimation conditional on group dummies, we
also estimate equation (1) via individual xed e¤ects. The inclusion of xed e¤ects controls for
any time invariant small-sample di¤erences between treatment groups, such as the di¤erence in
baseline prots seen in Table 1. We cluster errors at the rm level in all specications.
The rst four columns of Table 3 show the treatment e¤ects for the pooled sample. All four
specications show a large positive impact of the in-kind treatment on rm prots. Monthly
rm prots are estimated to be 31-43 cedis higher as a result of the 150 cedis in-kind treatment.
The cash treatment is signicant at the 10 percent level in the untrimmed OLS specication,
but becomes insignicant when trimming or using xed e¤ects. The coe¢ cients are always much
smaller than for the in-kind treatment, and we can reject equality of cash and in-kind grants at
the 5 percent signicant level for three out of four specications and at the 10 percent level for
the other. That is, cash grants have less impact on business prots than in-kind grants.
These initial results pool together all waves of the survey, thereby giving the average impact
of the treatments over the observed time period and improving power (McKenzie, 2011). We
observe rms at quarterly intervals, up to 12 months after treatment. Appendix 2 tests robust-
ness to allowing the impact of the grants to vary with the time since treatment, and tests for
equality of treatment e¤ects. There is some suggestion that the impact of the in-kind treatments
are greater 9-12 months after treatment than immediately afterwards, but we reject equality of
treatment e¤ects over time at the 10% level only for the in-kind treatment for females, and then
only with a xed e¤ects specication. Given the sample sizes we have and lack of strong evidence
to reject pooling, we therefore continue to pool all waves for the remainder of the paper.
In the remainder of Table 3 we allow the impact of the grants to vary by gender. Recall the
randomization was stratied by gender. We modify equation (9) to allow both the treatment
11Only 7 rms have pre-treatment prots above this level, but this trimming involves dropping 28 rms (1%
of the sample) since we need to drop other rms in the matched quadruplet. Doing this ensures that balanced
randomization occurred within the trimmed sample, and prevents a few rms with scale well above the rest of
the sample exerting undue inuence on the results.
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and wave e¤ects to vary by gender:
i;t+s = 1FiMit + 2FiEit + 3(1  Fi)Mit + 4(1  Fi)Eit
+
X
t
tDit +
X
t
Ft FiDit +
GX
g=1
gSig + "i;t+s (10)
where Fi = 1 if entrepreneur i is female, and 0 otherwise. Recall the randomization was stratied
by gender.
Columns 5 and 6 estimate equation (10) by OLS with quadruplet dummies, and columns 7
and 8 with individual xed e¤ects. Finally, columns (9) and (10) restrict the OLS estimation to
the last two waves of data. This corresponds to the data in Figures 1 and 2.12
For women, the estimated treatment e¤ect of the cash grant is always small (5 cedis or less)
and statistically insignicant, whereas the treatment e¤ect of the in-kind grant is large (35-50
cedis) and statistically signicant. In all specications we can reject equality of the cash and
in-kind treatment e¤ects. This conrms what is seen visually in Figure 2, that only the in-kind
grants have a signicant e¤ect for women. For males, the in-kind treatment e¤ect is also large,
although more sensitive to specication, ranging in size from 28 to 60 cedis, and statistically
signicant in all but one specication. After trimming, the magnitude of the in-kind treatment
e¤ect for males is very similar to that for females, and we cannot reject equality of in-kind
treatment e¤ects by gender in any specication. In contrast to females, we can never reject
equality of cash and in-kind treatment e¤ects for males. This is consistent with a failure of asset
integration for females but not for males.
The cash treatment e¤ect for males is statistically signicant and large when we restrict
analysis to waves 5 and 6, which is consistent with the e¤ects seen in Figure 1. However,
using all waves of the data, the estimated impact varies between 5 and 29 cedis depending on
specication, with large standard errors. The impact of cash is larger using OLS than xed
e¤ects because of an imbalance in baseline prots for males. The group assigned to the cash
grant has higher wave 1 prots (despite the same wave 2 pre-treatment prots) than either the
control group or the group assigned to the in-kind treatment. Because we balanced on wave 2
prots in the randomization, the imbalance is due to chance. It is therefore not clear whether or
12Readers may be concerned that prots are articially high in the quarter immediately after the equipment
treatment if rms receiving inventories to sell count this as pure prot. But Appendix 2 shows that, if anything,
the treatment e¤ect is rising with time since treatment. Furthermore, the treatment e¤ects are still present when
focusing on these nal rounds which are six months or more removed from almost all the treatments.
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not one should control for this pre-treatment di¤erence. If we are prepared to treat this chance
imbalance as noise and not condition on it, then there is some evidence for a signicant cash
e¤ect, at least in the last two rounds. But the condence interval for the male cash treatment
e¤ect when we do control for it with xed e¤ects is (-26.5, +36.7), indicating that the data
really have no information about the cash treatment e¤ect for males when we condition on this
di¤erence. In contrast, the in-kind treatment e¤ect for males and the cash and in-kind treatment
e¤ects for females are much more robust to the choice of specication, giving us more condence
in the results for these groups.
These ndings contrast with earlier experiments which failed to reject the equality of cash
and in-kind treatment e¤ects in grants to microenterprises in Sri Lanka and Mexico (de Mel et
al, 2008; McKenzie and Woodru¤, 2008). Why?
We rst note that the sample sizes used in the experiments in Sri Lanka and Mexico ulti-
mately resulted in low power to distinguish between cash and in-kind grants. In Sri Lanka the
sample size for analysis in de Mel et al. (2008) is 385 rms. They nd an ITT return of 4.17
percent for the in-kind treatment, and of 6.70 percent for the cash treatment. However, the
standard errors on these estimates are 2.6-2.8 percent, and one cannot reject at the 10 percent
level that the in-kind treatment has twice the e¤ect of the cash treatment (p=0.102). The sam-
ple size in Mexico for the analysis by McKenzie and Woodru¤ (2008) is even smaller, with 113
rms after trimming. The ITT returns are 34.4 percent for cash and 16.1 percent for in-kind,
but with standard errors of 23-24 percent. Thus it may be that Ghana is not di¤erent, but
rather that the prior studies did not have su¢ cient sample to detect di¤erences between cash
and in-kind grants. We return to this issue below.
5.2 Treatment Heterogeneity by Randomization Strata
Next we examine treatment e¤ect heterogeneity according to the other variables used for strat-
ication and matching. We do this separately by gender, given the di¤erences observed above.
Let A and B denote the two categories of a binary variable used for stratication (e.g. Ai = 1 if
i works in a single-sex dominated industry, and Bi = 1 if i works in a mixed-gender industry).
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Then we estimate separately for each gender:
i;t+s =1AiMit + 2AiEit + 3BiMit + 4BiEit
+
6X
t=2
tDit +
6X
t=2
tBiDit +
GX
g=1
gSig + "i;t+s:
The results are shown in Table 4. The top two rows of the table show the categories A and B
which dene strata. Columns (1) and (2) show the OLS and xed e¤ects estimates of treatment
heterogeneity by the gender mix of the industry rms work in. De Mel et al. (2009a) found
some evidence in Sri Lanka that the impact of grants was less for women in female-dominated
industries than those in mixed industries. In Ghana, panel A of column (2) shows that with xed
e¤ects, the cash treatment has a -6.9 cedis e¤ect in female-dominated industries versus a 1.8 cedis
e¤ect in mixed industries, and the in-kind treatment has a 25.4 cedis e¤ect in female-dominated
industries compared to a 39.8 cedis e¤ect in mixed industries. The point estimates are therefore
consistent with the idea that the grants may have more e¤ect on the businesses of women who
operate in mixed industries. However, the di¤erences in treatment e¤ects by industry category
are not statistically signicant. Likewise panel B shows no signicant heterogeneity by industry
category for men.
Columns (3) and (4) examine heterogeneity according to the baseline measure of capture.
Recall that individuals in the high capture category state that whenever they have money
on hand their family members are likely to request some of it, and that people who do well in
business get requests from others for help. We do not obtain signicant heterogeneity according
to this variable for either men or women, with large standard errors and the point estimates
varying quite a lot between the OLS and xed e¤ects specications. Later in the paper we
examine alternative measures of capture to see whether this lack of signicance is due to the
particular choice of measure being used.
Finally we look at heterogeneity according to the initial size of the rm. Columns (5) and
(6) consider this in terms of the initial capital stock of the rm, as rms were stratied as being
above or below median baseline capital stock, while columns (7) and (8) dene initial size in
terms of initial prots. Since wave 2 prots was matched to form quadruplets, we rst calculate
the maximum wave 2 prot within a quadruplet or group, and then dene rms as being in a
low prots group if the maximum wave 2 prots for the group is less than 138 cedis (the median
of prots over the whole sample). This classies 62 percent of females and 45 percent of males
as being in the low prots group. The results conrm the visual impression in Figures 1 and 2.
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In particular, we see that the cash grants have no signicant impact for any size female rm,
while the in-kind grants only have an impact for the 40 percent or so of rms with higher initial
prots or higher initial capital stock. The impact of the in-kind grants is extremely large for
these female rms monthly prots increase by 77 to 96 cedis per month for the female rms
in high initial prots quadruplets, compared to an insignicant 2 to 5 cedis per month for the
low prots female rms. This di¤erence is statistically signicant. In contrast, there is no such
pattern for male-owned rms the point estimates for the lower prots rms are typically just
as large as those for the higher prots rms, and the di¤erence is not statistically signicant.
Taking these results together, it appears that cash grants are not increasing prots for
female-owned rms, and the in-kind grants only increase prots for female-owned rms which
were larger in size to begin with. The in-kind treatments also increased prots for male-owned
rms, and the e¤ect of the cash grants is inconclusive for males. There does not appear to be
the same heterogeneity by initial rm size in terms of male responsiveness to the grants. This
suggests that female-owned rms are better able to resist internal or external pressure when the
treatment comes in the form of inventories or equipment, while the di¤erence in treatment is
less relevant for male-owned businesses. We now scrutinize this interpretation more in detail.
6 Interpretation of the results
6.1 Where do the grants go?
Table 5 examines the extent to which the grants are being used to increase the capital stock of
the rm, to make transfers to non-household members, and for household spending. In panel A
we show the results of estimating equation (2) with di¤erent outcomes, while in panel B we show
the results of estimating equation (3) for the female sample and the categorization of low and
high initial prots groups, since this is where we found large di¤erences in treatment e¤ects. For
reasons of space we report the xed e¤ects estimates only (with the exception of transfers out
which were not measured pre-treatment), but note when the OLS results show large di¤erences.
We begin by looking at the impact of the grants on the capital stock of the rms. Column (1)
shows this for total capital stock. In order to reduce the inuence of large outliers, column (2)
truncates capital stock at the 99.5th percentile, which is 6130 cedis. Both specications suggest
that capital stock is increasing by more for the in-kind treatments than for the cash treatments,
both for men and women. However, the capital stock data is noisy and the standard errors
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are large, meaning we cannot reject equality of the e¤ect of cash and in-kind grants on capital
stock. Panel B shows stark di¤erences between the women whose prots were initially low and
those who had higher initial prots there are large increases in capital stock for the high initial
prots group, and no increase in capital stock for the low initial prots group that received the
cash treatment. After truncating outliers, we can reject equality in treatment e¤ects for the low
and high initial prots groups for both cash and in-kind grants.
Figures 3 and 4 show the empirical CDFs of the post-treatment capital stock distribution
by treatment group and gender for the nal two waves of the survey. For males, Figure 3 shows
a similar pattern to that of prots  namely that the distribution of the in-kind treatment
group is shifted to the right compared to that of the control group across the distribution. The
cash distribution is in between, although right at the top of the distribution crosses the control
distribution curve several times, which explains the sensitivity of the cash treatment e¤ect to
where we truncate the data. For females, Figure 4 shows that both treatment groups overlap
with the control group for the bottom 60 percent of the distribution, a pattern similar to that
seen for prots. The in-kind grant distribution then separates from the control above this,
with women in the in-kind treatment group having higher 70, 80, and 90th percentiles of their
capital stock distributions than the control group. The cash treatment group lies in between,
and, unlike in the case of prots, does separate somewhat from the control group at the top
of the distribution, suggesting some increases in capital for some rms as a result of the cash
treatment.
Next we examine where the grants are going if not into the business. Beginning in wave 4,
rm owners were asked During the past three months, did you make any payments in cash or
goods to people living outside your household?and if so, the value of such transfers. Columns
3 and 4 show that women who received the cash grant were more likely to have made such a
transfer, and to have given more. On average they are estimated to have given 8 cedis more
a quarter over the last 3 quarters of the survey. This does not account for any transfers out
made in the rst quarter after treatment by rms treated after wave 2, since the wave 3 survey
did not collect transfers data. However, restricting the analysis to the control group and rms
treated after wave 3 only marginally increases the coe¢ cient on the cash treatment, raising it
to 8.9 cedis.
The remaining columns report the estimated impacts on household expenditure, which was
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collected each wave.13 Point estimates suggest higher positive impacts on expenditure for those
receiving the cash treatments than those getting the in-kind treatment or the control group,
especially for women with low initial prots. We see a large and highly signicant e¤ect of
the cash treatment on total quarterly spending for women as a whole, and for the subgroup of
women with low initial prots. The coe¢ cients are huge: women who were given a 150 cedis cash
grant are estimated to be spending 120 cedis more a quarter after the grant. The magnitude of
this coe¢ cient appears to be driven by a few rm owners reporting very large spending levels
truncating at the 99th percentile of total expenditure lowers this coe¢ cient to 95, and at the
95th percentile lowers it to 76 cedis (which is still signicant at the 5% level). For males receiving
the cash treatment, the point estimates also suggest large increases in total quarterly spending
(with a coe¢ cient of 50 to 73 cedis depending on the level of truncation), but the standard error
is so large that we can never reject equality with zero.
These results therefore o¤er an explanation at a basic level for the prots results. More of the
in-kind grants ended up in the business than the cash grants. Women, especially those with lower
initial prots, appear to have spent most, if not all, of the grants on household expenditure and
transfers to non-household members. As a result, we see more impact of in-kind grants than cash
grants on business prots. Note however that for women with high initial prot who received the
cash treatment, Table 5 shows an increase in capital stock and no signicant change in spending,
despite the lack of a signicant increase in prots for this group. There are only 44 women who
are in the high initial prots group who received the cash treatment, so small sample noise is a
potential explanation. Indeed, the 95% condence interval for the e¤ect on prots of the cash
treatment for the initial high prot group is (-26, +40). So despite the small and insignicant
13Households were asked to recall the last weeks expenditure on food, last months expenditure on 9 categories
(housing, fuel and light, non-durable households goods, communication, recreation, transport, household services,
personal care services, and contributions to associations) and last three months expenditure on a further 9
categories (clothing, footwear, ceremonies such as funerals and weddings, electronic goods, household furnishings,
household appliances, vehicles, health expenses, and education expenses). We aggregate several categories to
report estimates of impact on several categories of interest, as well as impacts on total quarterly spending (which
adds 13 times weekly food, and 3 times the last months expenses to the three month expenses). Unlike prots,
panel consistency checks were not programmed for these expenditure items, and the data are quite noisy. In order
to ensure extreme outliers are not driving the reported results, we report results using expenditures truncated at
the 99.5th percentile. Results using the untruncated expenditures are qualitatively similar with larger standard
errors, and slightly larger point estimates. The impacts on specic household expenditure categories are not
well-identied due to this noise.
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point estimate, we cannot completely rule out the possibility that the high initial prot women
receiving the cash treatment are also investing it in the business and benet through higher
prots.
6.2 How do the low and high initial prot women di¤er?
We have seen that the impact of the grants di¤ers greatly between women with low initial
prots and women with high initial prots. It is therefore worth examining in more detail the
composition of these two subsamples. The rst point to note is that these groups dont di¤er
greatly in the industry or type of business, just in the scale. The low initial prot group is
made up of 31 percent food sales, 18 percent beauty and hair, 9 percent sewing, and 42 percent
trade, compared to 37 percent food sales, 9 percent beauty and hair, 6 percent sewing and 47
percent trade for the high initial prot group. Even when we look more nely within these broad
sectors, we see a similar broad range of types of rms in both subgroups: kenkey and banku
(both traditional prepared foods) sellers, dressmakers, beauty salons, used clothes sellers, and
retail trade.
In contrast, the scale of the rms di¤ers substantially. Table 6 compares the pre-treatment
characteristics of these two subgroups of female rms to each other and to the male-owned
rms. The nal column also o¤ers a comparison to the sample of female microenterprises from
Sri Lanka used in de Mel et al. (2009a). We see that mean and median monthly prots for the
low initial prots female subsample is 37-38 cedis, approximately US$1 per day, while mean and
median prots are 4 to 6 times this level in the high prot group. Similarly, mean and median
sales di¤ers by a factor of 5 to 6 between the low and high initial prot groups. Mean capital
stock for the low initial prots group is 251, versus 456 for the high prots group. Comparing
to the other two groups, we see that the high initial prot females have larger prots than the
average male-owned rms in the sample, while the low initial prots group are similar in size to
the female-owned rms in the Sri Lankan study.
Table 6 also shows that women in the high initial prots group are more educated, have
richer households (which may be a consequence of the higher prots rather than a cause), are
more likely to keep accounts and to have had a formal loan, and have been in business slightly
longer than the low initial prots rms. When it comes to the reasons for choosing a particular
sector, women in the high prots group are more likely to say they chose their sector for earnings
potential and less likely to say they chose it because it had a low capital requirement.
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Overall this paints a picture of the low prots group as much smaller in size, with subsistence
level income. For this group we see no impact of the grants on business prots. This is consistent
with the nding in Sri Lanka, where the grants had no impact on female-owned businesses. The
Sri Lankan businesses are similar in scale to the low initial prots female rms in Ghana the
95th percentile of prots is only 70 per month in the Sri Lankan sample, which is the 10th
percentile of prots for the high initial prot group in Ghana. So for the types of female-owned
businesses in Ghana that are similar in scale to those in Sri Lanka, we obtain similar results.
Such businesses t the hypothesis of Emran et al. (2007) that many of the women drawn into
subsistence self-employment have very low e¢ cient scale and are there only because of labor
market imperfections. As a result, according to our models, neither cash nor in-kind grants
should have any long-term impacts on business protability for these types of low productivity
rms. The di¤erence is that the Ghanaian sample also includes a group of more successful
female-owned businesses with larger scale, who do show increased prot growth from at least
the in-kind treatment.
7 Why does the impact of cash and in-kind treatments vary?
We now examine more in detail the possible reasons for the di¤erence between the impact of
cash and in-kind grants, particularly for women. We rst discuss whether the RTI models can
account for this di¤erence.
The only way that the RTI models we presented in the conceptual section can account for
a di¤erence between the two treatments is if the in-kind treatment Et cannot be liquidated
immediately and the rm has already reached its steady-state. If this is the case, prots and
capital are predicted to rise above their steady state after the in-kind treatment, but only until
illiquid capital can be divested.
This e¤ect is unlikely to be prominent in our study. There is a relatively long lag between
treatment and ex post surveys. The time lag between receiving a grant and the immediately
subsequent survey is nearly 3 months. For those who received the grant after round 2, there
is an interval of nearly 12 months between receiving the grant and the last survey round. For
those receiving the grant after round 3, the time interval is 9 months. Given that recipients
of in-kind grants invest in raw materials, inventories, or simple equipment, it would be easy to
decapitalize in-kind grants between treatment and the next survey round. Furthermore, as we
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will see below, there is no evidence of divestment of the in-kind grants.
Another possibility is to modify the RTI setup to allow for learning. To see this formally,
remember that in the RTI models the steady state capital stock is set by equating the marginal
return to capital 0(k; ) to the relevant discount rate either  or r or  , depending on the
version of the model. If the entrepreneur believes  to be lower than its true value, say, e < ,
then the rm may stop growing before reaching its true steady state. Having been forced to
expand thanks to an in-kind grant, the entrepreneur may realize that he or she can successfully
handle a larger rm, i.e., that  > e. If there are enough entrepreneurs with e < , this could
explain our results.
Is there evidence in support of this hypothesis in the data? Prior to treatment, respondents
were asked whether they expected sales to increase if they invested more capital. Entrepreneurs
for whom e <  should respond negatively to this question. If learning explains our results,
the e¤ect of the in-kind treatment should be largest for entrepreneurs who expect the lowest
increase in sales from increasing capital. We test this hypothesis and nd instead that the in-
kind treatment has larger not smaller e¤ects for rm owners who expected to see a larger
increase in sales from investing more capital. There is therefore little evidence for the learning
hypothesis in the data.
We thus have to turn to potential explanations that focus on asset non-integration, such as
internal and external pressure. The surveys contain variables that proxy for the degree of self-
control and the degree of external pressure to share facing business owners. With the exception
of the high capturedummy which we examined in Table 4, treatment randomization was not
stratied on any of these variables. Our analysis should therefore be considered exploratory in
nature.
We have four measures which each measure an aspect of self-control and the ability to save
cash, all of which were measured pre-treatment. The rst two refer to actual saving behavior
as reported by respondents before treatment: whether the respondent used a susu collector and
whether the respondent agrees or strongly agrees with the statement I save regularly(which
two-thirds of respondents do). These rst two variables have the advantage that they capture
actual, not hypothetical, behavior. But they could potentially be a¤ected by external pressure,
for instance if someone is unable to save because of a pressure to redistribute, or enters in a
contract with a susu collector to keep money away from a prying husband, as in Anderson and
Baland (2002). The other two variables we use are the discount rate and measure of hyperbolicity,
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which are less subject to this possible confounding e¤ect, and are thus arguably more reliable.
We also extract the common signal in these four variables by forming a principal component,
which we call lack of self-control.14 High scores indicate a lower likelihood of using a susu and
of saving regularly, and a higher likelihood of being hyperbolic and of having a high discount
rate. The lack of self-control index is thus the common component of using a susu and saving
regularly that is correlated with hyperbolic time preferences.
The rst ve columns of Table 7 estimate model (8) to examine the heterogeneity in the
treatment e¤ect with respect to these self-control variables for the pooled sample in panel A,
and for females only in panel B. Point estimates show a larger impact of the cash treatment when
the rm owner uses a susu, saves regularly, is patient, and is not hyperbolic. The signs of the
coe¢ cients on the interaction with cash treatment for each of the four variables are consistent
with the idea that lack of self-control is associated with a smaller increase in business prots
from the cash treatment. Column 5 shows that when we combine all these variables into an
index of self-control using principal components, the interaction between cash treatment and
lack of self-control is signicant at the 5 percent level. This implies that the e¤ect of the cash
treatment for someone with the most self-control is 29.2, which is similar to the average impact
of the in-kind treatment of 30.9 in column 4 of Table 3. The female only sample in panel B shows
a similar pattern in terms of signs of the coe¢ cients, but interaction terms are not signicant,
possibly because the sample is smaller.
We also investigate whether cash and in-kind grants have a di¤erentiated e¤ect on capital
retention depending on entrepreneur self-control. Figure 5 presents the evolution of capital stock
after treatment, contrasting between cash and in-kind grants for entrepreneurs with and without
self-control. The Figure shows that in-kind grants are retained in the rm and lead to further
accumulation of capital whether the entrepreneur lacks self-control or not although the e¤ect
on capital accumulation is strongest for those with low self-control. In contrast, cash grants
have, if anything a negative e¤ect on capital accumulation among low self-control entrepreneurs
while the e¤ect is positive and growing for those with high self-control. This conrms that
the reason why in-kind grants have a strong positive e¤ect on prot is related to self-control
issues and their e¤ect on the accumulation of capital. If we further interact the self-control
index with high baseline prots, we nd that self-control a¤ects the impact of treatment only
for female entrepreneurs with high baseline prots. For those with low initial prots, treatment
14The principal component has mean zero, and ranges from -1.67 to 2.26.
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has no e¤ect irrespective of self-control. If we are willing to regard baseline prots as proxy for
ability , this suggests that self-control is an impediment to growth only for more able female
entrepreneurs, who have more potential for growth.
Next we examine whether the pattern of heterogeneous treatment e¤ects in the sample is
consistent with external pressure. We rst investigate capture by spouses. Unmarried individuals
are not, by denition, subject to capture by a spouse. Consequently, if capture by a spouse is
the main reason why cash treatments do not raise prot, this should not a¤ect unmarried
entrepreneurs especially women. To test this hypothesis, we interact treatment with a married
dummy and expect the cash treatment e¤ect now to be positive and the interaction term to be
negative, especially for female entrepreneurs. The percentage of unmarried individuals in our
sample is 34% for females and 35% for males. Results, presented in columns (1) and (2) of Table
8, show that the cash treatment remains non-signicant for female entrepreneurs. None of the
interaction terms is statistically signicant but point estimates for females are positive for cash
and negative for in-kind, which is the opposite of what the external pressure hypothesis predicts.
Married status is also not (negatively) correlated with baseline capital stock, as should be case
if marriage leads to more capture.
Next we examine the determinants of bargaining power between married entrepreneurs. The
hypothesis is that less of the cash and in-kind treatment is taxed away from the business when a
married entrepreneur has more bargaining power with his or her spouse. We expect the e¤ect of
bargaining to be stronger for female entrepreneurs, given their subordinate status in traditional
society. The rst proxy for bargaining power is the share of assets brought to marriage by the
owner. This information is available for 397 married respondents.
As shown in columns (3) and (4) of Table 8, point estimates are insignicant and do not go
in the expected direction: we would expect those who bring a higher share of assets into the
marriage to have more bargaining power, yet the interaction of this with the cash treatment is
negative. We also test (not shown) whether the share of assets brought to marriage is correlated
with baseline capital stock, as should be the case if entrepreneurs with more bargaining power
are less subject to spouse taxation and can accumulate more over time. We nd no evidence of
this.
We investigate other possible determinants of intra-household bargaining power, such as
di¤erences between spouses in age and education level. We expect older, more educated spouses
to have more bargaining power. The results, shown, in columns (5) to (8) of Table 8, are once
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again not signicant and the point estimates of the interaction terms are small. In columns (9)
and (10) we use more subjective data: namely whether the respondent agrees that they can
spend their income without consulting their spouse (72 percent of women and 71 percent of
men say they can). By construction, this information is only available for married respondents.
We again nd no statistically signicant interaction e¤ect with the cash treatment and point
estimates small for women.
The last proxy for bargaining power that we investigate is the share of individual income in
total household income or expenditure. Much of the literature on intra-household bargaining has
used relative incomes as proxy for bargaining power, either because having more income gives
more agency, or because earning an income outside the home results from having more bargaining
power. We construct our proxy using income and consumption information at baseline. We
expect spouses with a larger income share to retain more of the treatment and thus to have
a larger treatment e¤ect.15 Results, presented in columns (11) to (14) of Table 8, show no
statistically signicant interaction.
We next turn to external pressure more broadly dened, i.e., including individuals other than
the spouse. The rst proxy we consider is the absolute size of the household. Presumably, the
more members a household has, the more people there are who can put pressure on the respon-
dent to share cash and in-kind grants. Pressure need not be explicit, though. If respondents are
altruistic towards other members of their household, they may feel the need to share the grants
with them instead of investing. In this case the needs of others are internalized and no explicit
pressure need be applied.
The next proxy is whether the rm owner says they feel a lot or some pressure to share
extra business income with other household members rather than invest in the business. 23
percent of females and 22 percent of males claim to feel this pressure. This information was only
collected in the last survey round, after treatments, so results should be considered as suggestive
only. There is, however, no di¤erence in means on this variable between treated and untreated
samples. As a proxy for pressure from outside the household, we include the number of siblings
in the Accra/Tema area. Presumably, the more siblings a person has, the more relatives there
15Share of household income or consumption is not an ideal proxy for our purpose since it also reects entrepre-
neurial ability, and more able entrepreneurs may benet more from treatment. For a given ability level, a higher
share of household income also implies that other household members are not high earners and hence that the
entrepreneur is more capital constrained. This too would predict a higher treatment e¤ect. Given that we nd
no signicant e¤ect, this issue is moot.
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are who could put pressure on the respondent to share the grants or the more relative there
are towards whom the respondent may have altruistic feelings.
Results are presented in Table 9. When we look at the full sample we do not see any
signicant interactions between the cash treatment e¤ect and proxies for external pressure. The
size of the interaction terms on pressure to share is too small to generate large positive impacts
of the cash treatment. When we consider the females-only sample in panel B, we get a signicant
but positive interactions on household size and on the number of siblings in the area i.e., the
opposite sign of what we would expect from external pressure. This is nevertheless consistent
with Grimm et al. (2010) who nd a positive impact of nearby networks on rm growth. These
ndings are also in line with the lack of sizeable or signicant interaction with low capture seen
in Table 4 for the low capture/high capture variable we stratied on.
Taken together, the evidence from Tables 7, 8 and 9 appears more consistent with self-control
rather than external pressure being the cause of the lack of an e¤ect of the cash treatment. One
might however worry that people who have trouble saving or have time-inconsistent preferences
and high discount rates are also those who more external pressure.
To examine this possibility, we test in Table 10 whether proxies for external pressure are
signicantly associated with the lack of self-control index. In addition to the variables used
to proxy external pressure in Table 7, we also consider: whether they think inventories and
equipment held in the business are a good way of saving money so others dont take it (55
percent of women and 72 percent of men say yes); whether the respondent had been compelled
to give money to their spouse in the three months prior to the baseline (10 percent of married
women and 15 percent of married men said yes); and whether their spouse is supportive of them
running a business (84 percent say yes for both men and women).
We cannot reject the null hypothesis that none of the proxies for external pressure are
associated with the self-control index. While measuring external pressure is di¢ cult, if self-
control was merely proxying for external pressure, we would expect some relationship, yet there
is none. We therefore conclude that there is more evidence to support the hypothesis that the
di¤erence between cash and in-kind treatments is driven by self-control issues than by external
pressure.
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8 Conclusions
We nd that the e¤ect of in-kind and cash grants is signicantly di¤erent, a nding that is
di¢ cult to reconcile with models of accumulation that take either a standard Ramsey form,
or allow for pure time inconsistence. These results suggest a lack of asset integration, as if
entrepreneurs fail to take consumption and investment decisions jointly. The di¤erence between
in-kind and cash grants is suggestive either that inventories and equipment serve as a self-
commitment device against impulse purchases or that entrepreneurs evade a social solidarity
tax, by household members and relatives, on the cash ow of the rm but not its equipment
and inventories.
We nd that cash and in-kind grants have signicantly di¤erent e¤ects for female entre-
preneurs in Ghana. In-kind grants lead to large increases in business prots, but only for
female-owned rms which were initially more protable  subsistence rms dont grow when
given more capital. In-kind grants also lead to large increases in business prots for men, while
the e¤ect of cash grants is less robust we nd large positive and signicant e¤ects when we
dont condition on baseline prots, but smaller and insignicant e¤ects when we do. The di¤er-
ence between cash and in-kind treatments is strongest among successful female entrepreneurs,
that is, those with high pre-treatment prots.
We seek to identify the reason for the di¤erence in treatment between cash and in-kind
grants, i.e., whether it originates in self-control di¢ culties or in pressure from household and
family members. The fact that the di¤erence in treatment e¤ects is only statistically signicant
among female entrepreneurs is suggestive of external pressure: given the social context, women
entrepreneurs are expected to be subjected to pressure from husband and children. However,
we fail to nd conrmatory evidence for this hypothesis when interact treatment with proxies
for external pressure. In contrast, we nd that individuals with more self-control di¢ culties
respond better to treatment in terms of prots. There is no evidence that female entrepreneurs
lack self-control more than men.
Ghana o¤ers a setting where women are the majority of small business owners, and in this
setting we nd the top 40 percent of women in terms of protability look similar or more
protable than the average male rm. Such a large group of relatively high achieving women is
not present in the Sri Lankan sample of de Mel et al. (2009a), and indeed the remaining group
of subsistence-level Ghanaian female business owners have similar negligible business impacts
from the grants as the group of women in the Sri Lankan experiment.
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The results o¤er partially good news for advocates of directing micronance at women. We
do nd in Ghana a relatively large group of women whose prots increase a lot when given
in-kind transfers. Microcredit has been argued as allowing individuals to overcome present-bias
by providing self-discipline and encouragement through regular payments and group meetings
(Bauer et al, 2010). If this is true, the e¤ectiveness of micro loans in improving business outcomes
is likely to resemble the e¤ect of in-kind grants in our experiment. However, our ndings suggest
this e¤ect to be more powerful for women who are already earning more to begin with, suggesting
possible limits on the ability of capital alone to generate business growth among poor subsistence-
level female enterprises. Moreover, as in prior work in Sri Lanka and Mexico, the results show
that the average male-owned microenterprise gains a lot from being granted additional access
to capital. This suggests that micronance programs that focus primarily on women may be
ignoring a large group of enterprises with a need for more capital.
Finally, our results suggest that loans and grants intended to help female enterprises grow
would work better if disbursed in kind, not in cash. Banks already seem to know this, given that
bank loans are nearly always in kind: when borrowing to purchase a house, car, or machine,
the bank does not hand over the money to the borrower but rather pays the supplier/seller
directly.16 If their objective is to foster enterprise development, and not just saving, micro-
nance organizations may want to adopt similar practices.
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Appendix 1: Steady state rm size with time inconsistency
Let  denote the one period-ahead discount rate:17
1
1 + 
 :
Let ks be the level of capital that satises:
0(ks; ) =  :
Is ks the steady state capital of a time inconsistent entrepreneur? It depends on whether the
decision maker is sophisticate or myopic, that is, whether he or she realizes that future decisions
were taken according to (3) or not.
Suppose the decision maker is sophisticate and sets kt = ks. Is this a steady state? The
Euler equation between t and t+ 1 is:
1 + 0(kt+1; ) =
1

 u
0
t(ct)
u0t+1(cPt+1)
(11)
where cPt+1 denotes the households predicted future decision about ct+1. If the household is
myopic, cPt+1 is expected to coincide with the decision made at time t, i.e., as given by (2). If
the household is sophisticate, it is the correctly anticipated decision taken at time t+1 as given
by the solution to (3).
First note that if cPt+1 = ct, then u
0
t(ct) = u
0
t+1(c
P
t+1) and setting kt = k
s satises the
above Euler equation. If the entrepreneur is sophisticate and sets kt = ks, she realizes that
the decision problem and Euler equation at t + 1 will be identical to those at t. Hence she
correctly anticipates that cPt+1 = ct. It follows that k
s is the steady state level of rm capital for
a sophisticate entrepreneur.
If the entrepreneur is myopic and sets kt = ks, she incorrectly believes that she will be more
patient next period. Let cMt+1 denote the consumption level she sets for t+ 1, not realizing that
at t+1 she will want to increase consumption beyond cMt+1. At kt = k
s the entrepreneur expects
cMt+1 < ct, which implies that u
0
t+1(c
P
t+1) > u
0
t(ct). Hence k
s does not satisfy the Euler equation
(11) and is not a steady state. For a myopic decision maker, the steady state capital km is such
that ct = ct+1 and cMt+1 = c
M
t+2. Since c
M
t+1 < ct+1, it follows that
u0t(ct)
u0t+1(c
M
t+1)
< 1, which in turn
implies that ks < km and
0(km; ) > :
17 It is clear that  > . If, as is likely,  > r, the household will never want to set w > 0. So we ignore savings
here.
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Appendix 2: Robustness to Attrition
Attrition in the panel comes from rms closing, refusing to answer the survey, or answering
the survey but not providing prots data. Appendix Table A1 provides attrition rates per round
for the experimental sample. Recall that we eliminated rms which closed or refused to answer
the round 2 survey before undertaking the randomization. As a result, attrition from the survey
is zero by denition for the experimental group in rounds 1 and 2, although there is some item
non-response on prots. Over the course of our experiment we observe 6 percent of the rms
closing, with this rate not varying between treatment and control. We were able to keep attrition
fairly low over waves 3 through 6 of the survey, and exerted additional e¤ort in round 6 to try
and track and induce responses by rms that had attrited in previous waves. As a result, only
8 percent of the sample is not present in wave 6, although 11 percent do not report prots
data. Nevertheless, overall attrition rates are higher for the control group than either treatment
group, likely reecting either an implicit obligation felt by those receiving grants to continue in
the survey, or discouragement of those who werent randomly selected for the grants. Whilst
statistically signicant, the di¤erence in attrition magnitudes are not that large, which should
limit the impact of this di¤erential attrition on our results.
To examine how robust our results are to attrition, we use the bounding approach of Lee
(2009) to construct upper and lower bounds for the treatment e¤ect. The key identifying assump-
tion for implementing these bounds is a monotonicity assumption that treatment assignment
a¤ects sample selection only in one direction. In our context, this requires assuming that there
are some rms who would have attrited if they had not been assigned to treatment, but that
no rm attrits because of getting assigned to treatment. This seems plausible in our context.
We then construct the bounds by trimming either the top or the bottom of the distribution of
prots for the treatment groups by the relative di¤erence in attrition rates between treatment
and control. This is done on a wave by wave basis, and involves trimming up to 6 percent from
the top or bottom of the distribution of the treatment group.
Table A2 shows the results of estimating these Lee bounds. Columns 1 and 2 repeat the
main trimmed estimates from Table 3 for comparison. These lie between the bounds estimated
in columns 3 and 4 using OLS, and in columns 5 and 6 using xed e¤ects. We see that our
parameter estimates are much closer to the upper bounds than the lower bounds, which reects
the skewed distribution of prots.
The lower bounds occur only if it is the most protable control rms that attrit. However,
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a panel regression predicting attrition in the control group (in the form of missing prots) as
a function of the previous periods prots nds that having the previous periods prots in the
top 10 percent or in the bottom 10 percent, or below the median has no signicant e¤ect on
attrition. Similarly, we rms which experience large changes in prots over two waves are no
more likely to attrit in the subsequent wave. As a result, it seems attrition in the control group is
not associated with previous levels or previous changes in prots. Given this, it seems reasonable
to assume that prots are either missing at random, or missing in rms which su¤er negative
shocks that cause the rm to shut down or the owner to be sick in the survey period. That
is, there seems reason to believe either the panel estimates in columns (1) or (2), or the upper
bound estimates which are based on the least successful control rms attriting. There seems to
be no evidence to support the most successful control rms attriting, which is what the lower
bound estimates assume. We therefore conclude the main results do not seem to be driven by
attrition.
Appendix 3: Is it reasonable to pool e¤ects over time?
To test for pooling of treatment e¤ects we allow the coe¢ cients on treatment in equation (1)
to vary with time since treatment. In doing this, one should note that we only observe e¤ects 12
months after treatment for the rms treated after round 2, which is half of the treated sample.
In contrast, we observe e¤ects at 3 months and 6 months for the entire treated sample, and
e¤ects at 9 months for almost all the sample (excepting the 18 rms treated after round 4).
Appendix Table A3 then shows the results. We cannot reject that the impact of treatment does
not vary with time since treatment for the pooled sample, and for the male sample, or for the
female sample using OLS. For the female sample using xed e¤ects, the p-value for equality of
in-kind treatment e¤ects over time is 0.057, o¤ering some suggestion that the impact is greater
with more time since treatment.
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 Figure 1: Post-treatment CDFs of Monthly Profits for Males by Treatment Group 
 
Figure 2: Post-treatment CDFs of Monthly Profits for Females by Treatment Group 
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 Figure 3: Post-treatment CDFs of Capital Stock for Males by Treatment Group 
 
Figure 4: Post-treatment CDFs of Capital Stock for Females by Treatment Group 
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Table 1: Characteristics of Microenterprises and Verification of Randomization
N Control Cash In‐kind N Control Cash In‐kind
Variables Using to Stratify or Match
Monthly profits in January 2009  781 128 132 131 753 103 99 115
Female 793 0.60 0.60 0.61 765 0.62 0.62 0.62
High Capture 793 0.58 0.58 0.57 765 0.58 0.58 0.57
High Baseline Capital Stock 793 0.49 0.49 0.49 765 0.48 0.48 0.48
Male in Male dominated industry 793 0.18 0.19 0.18 765 0.18 0.18 0.18
Male in Mixed industry 793 0.21 0.21 0.21 765 0.20 0.20 0.20
Female in Female dominated industry 793 0.29 0.29 0.29 765 0.30 0.29 0.30
Female in Mixed industry 793 0.31 0.31 0.31 765 0.32 0.32 0.32
Other Variables
Monthly profits in October/November 2008 729 124 133 104 704 93 129 99
Monthly sales in January 2009 790 724 463 630 762 412 402 595
Number of hours worked in last week 785 58.82 60.55 57.13 757 59.03 60.64 56.64
Total Capital Stock in January 2009 784 468 454 418 757 446 438 410
Inventories at end of January 2009 791 258 213 201 763 239 203 198
Uses a Susu Collector 791 0.49 0.46 0.49 763 0.49 0.46 0.51
Business operated out of home 793 0.76 0.78 0.82 765 0.77 0.78 0.83
Age of Firm 788 7.87 7.13 7.22 761 7.88 7.11 7.14
Ever had bank or microfinance loan 793 0.11 0.10 0.07 765 0.10 0.09 0.07
Business has a tax number 786 0.15 0.14 0.13 758 0.14 0.14 0.13
Owner is Married 791 0.65 0.64 0.67 763 0.65 0.63 0.68
Owner's Years of Education 775 8.87 8.75 9.05 749 8.81 8.70 9.00
Owner's Digitspan Recall 768 5.11 5.07 5.03 740 5.07 5.10 4.99
Owner is Akan Speaker 793 0.45 0.41 0.43 765 0.46 0.41 0.43
Owner is Ga/Dangme Speaker 793 0.28 0.27 0.31 765 0.29 0.27 0.32
Owner's Age 791 36.39 35.43 35.74 763 36.36 35.37 35.79
Note: Trimmed Sample eliminates matched groups in which baseline profits for at least one firm
 in group exceed 1500 cedis per month
The only differences between groups which are statistically significant at conventional levels are January 2009 sales 
and October/November 2009 profits in the trimmed sample.
Full Sample Trimmed Sample
Table 2: Correlates of Baseline Capital Stock
(1) (2) (3)
Hyperbolic Discounter ‐196.1**
(82.13)
Low Discount Rate  94.53
(73.46)
Lack of self‐control index ‐60.34*
(32.48)
Feels pressure to share in household ‐201.3**
(87.38)
Digitspan Recall 34.02* 35.51* 44.34**
(18.24) (18.32) (18.10)
Raven test score 13.20 15.85 21.77
(13.49) (13.51) (13.32)
Education Years 13.95 13.42 6.674
(11.15) (11.19) (11.09)
Female ‐193.9** ‐198.5*** ‐137.8*
(75.45) (75.87) (75.17)
Age 13.63*** 14.02*** 12.57***
(4.162) (4.179) (4.228)
Father's schooling 1.880 2.144 0.168
(7.408) (7.445) (7.283)
Mother's schooling 4.200 3.842 2.374
(8.064) (8.106) (8.001)
Constant ‐244.5 ‐263.3 ‐207.3
(220.8) (220.9) (220.0)
Observations 652 650 621
R‐squared 0.053 0.049 0.043
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3: Main Treatment Effects
Dependent Variable: Real Monthly Profits (Cedi)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
OLS OLS FE FE OLS OLS FE FE OLS OLS
Cash Treatment 14.50* 9.59 3.96 0.48
(8.68) (7.32) (13.89) (8.23)
In‐kind Treatment 38.60*** 36.75*** 43.23*** 30.87***
(11.21) (10.67) (12.31) (10.73)
Cash Treatment*Female 5.21 5.17 1.22 ‐2.30 5.74 5.59
(8.47) (8.54) (9.35) (8.77) (11.57) (11.62)
In‐kind Treatment*Female 35.75** 37.65** 35.61*** 32.87** 47.35** 49.92**
(14.94) (14.94) (13.56) (13.21) (21.35) (21.44)
Cash Treatment*Male 28.99 16.81 8.74 5.13 44.79** 34.17**
(17.68) (13.25) (31.58) (16.10) (19.42) (15.51)
In‐kind Treatment*Male 43.38** 35.45** 55.15** 27.83 60.33*** 50.61***
(16.80) (14.04) (23.06) (18.15) (19.76) (17.66)
Constant 119.69*** 102.19*** 120.34*** 103.05*** 119.70*** 102.20*** 120.37*** 103.05*** 99.47*** 94.92***
(8.84) (4.40) (7.37) (3.71) (8.85) (4.39) (7.38) (3.70) (5.95) (5.50)
Baseline trimming No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Waves All All All All All All All All 5 and 6 5 and 6
Observations 4354 4203 4354 4203 4354 4203 4354 4203 1392 1344
Number of firms 792 764 792 764 792 764 792 764 736 710
P‐values for testing:
  Cash = In‐kind 0.0668 0.0306 0.0128 0.0156
  Cash = In‐kind for Females 0.0725 0.0565 0.0205 0.0187 0.0736 0.058
  Cash = In‐kind for Males 0.4873 0.2998 0.1486 0.3051 0.5164 0.4207
  Cash Male = Cash Female 0.2254 0.4604 0.8196 0.6854 0.0845 0.1406
  In‐kind Male = In‐kind Female 0.7346 0.9145 0.4653 0.8224 0.6555 0.9804
Notes:
All estimation includes wave effects, which vary by gender in columns 5 on. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the firm level. 
Trimmed specifications trim out matched quadruplets which have at least one firm with profits above 1500 cedis per month in wave 1 or  2
OLS estimation includes dummies for the matched quadruplets.
*, ** and *** denote significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.
Table 4: Treatment Heterogeneity by Randomization Strata
Dependent Variable: Real Monthly Profits (Cedi)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE
Interaction Category A
Interaction Category B
Panel A:  Females
Cash Treatment*Category A 9.62 ‐6.87 2.12 ‐8.53 3.13 ‐11.25 3.29 ‐8.58
(10.08) (10.57) (12.40) (13.55) (10.62) (11.75) (7.15) (9.65)
Cash Treatment*Category B 1.44 1.78 7.89 4.49 8.29 8.98 6.83 6.81
(13.37) (13.47) (12.00) (11.35) (14.05) (13.06) (20.59) (17.01)
In‐kind Treatment*Category A 26.37* 25.39 28.30 35.41 15.96 14.25 2.21 4.58
(14.31) (17.03) (23.00) (24.07) (10.77) (10.41) (6.97) (7.52)
In‐kind Treatment*Category B 48.26* 39.77** 46.66*** 31.06** 65.06** 55.67** 96.18*** 76.53**
(25.60) (19.94) (14.15) (12.50) (30.21) (26.19) (36.95) (30.69)
Number of Observations 2604 2604 2604 2604 2604 2604 2604 2604
Number of Firms 474 474 474 474 474 474 474 474
P‐values for testing:
  Cash Treatments equal 0.625 0.614 0.740 0.462 0.771 0.250 0.871 0.432
  In‐kind Treatments equal 0.456 0.584 0.457 0.873 0.124 0.142 0.013 0.023
  Cash=In‐kind 0.156 0.058 0.056 0.061 0.155 0.051 0.119 0.056
Panel B: Males
Cash Treatment*Category A ‐2.82 ‐5.75 ‐0.06 10.72 0.68 ‐0.72 17.23 ‐1.50
(16.42) (21.54) (19.55) (23.92) (18.06) (20.14) (12.99) (12.76)
Cash Treatment*Category B 36.60* 17.00 25.13 0.77 30.16 8.66 15.43 9.50
(20.25) (23.63) (17.36) (21.00) (18.83) (24.00) (22.96) (27.99)
In‐kind Treatment*Category A 44.85** 23.47 43.56 58.33 46.55** 26.33 35.08* 32.20
(21.72) (31.46) (27.06) (35.74) (19.24) (25.52) (18.00) (23.07)
In‐kind Treatment*Category B 28.55 33.69 30.49* 8.94 25.78 28.51 34.88 21.99
(18.54) (20.66) (15.76) (19.42) (20.31) (25.59) (21.57) (27.48)
Observations 1599 1599 1599 1599 1599 1599 1599 1599
Number of Firms 290 290 290 290 290 290 290 290
P‐values for testing:
  Cash Treatments equal 0.132 0.477 0.337 0.755 0.260 0.765 0.946 0.721
  In‐kind Treatments equal 0.569 0.786 0.677 0.226 0.458 0.952 0.994 0.776
  Cash=In‐kind 0.151 0.596 0.312 0.349 0.171 0.509 0.563 0.417
Notes:
All estimation includes wave effects which vary by category. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the firm level. 
Trimmed sample used. OLS estimation includes dummies for the matched quadruplets.
*, ** and *** denote significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.
Low Profits
High Profits
Single‐Sex Industry
Mixed Industry
Low Capture
High Capture
Low Capital
High Capital
Table 5: Where do the grants go?
Quarterly
Truncated Made a Amount  Weekly Quarterly Health & Quarterly Total Log
Capital Capital Transfer Transferred Food Clothing Education Ceremonies Quarterly Quarterly
Stock Stock Out Out Spending Spending Spending Spending Spending Spending
FE FE OLS OLS FE FE FE FE FE FE
Panel A: Males and Females
Cash Treatment*Female 82.61 49.17 0.05* 8.05** 3.81 3.38 ‐1.05 1.39 120.54*** 0.08*
(72.01) (37.27) (0.03) (3.46) (2.44) (3.90) (13.42) (3.17) (45.61) (0.04)
In‐kind Treatment*Female 135.34** 120.24*** 0.02 1.76 ‐0.07 ‐0.50 ‐6.08 2.33 45.36 ‐0.02
(65.55) (34.51) (0.03) (2.92) (2.60) (4.39) (13.03) (3.46) (44.36) (0.04)
Cash Treatment*Male 31.36 2.21 0.03 ‐4.06 3.93 9.52* 0.98 3.27 63.94 0.03
(70.33) (61.10) (0.04) (3.93) (3.12) (5.08) (11.26) (3.92) (50.82) (0.04)
In‐kind Treatment*Male 157.71 83.74 0.01 ‐6.01 ‐2.82 3.63 ‐0.85 4.36 20.95 ‐0.01
(102.12) (69.85) (0.04) (3.95) (3.42) (5.83) (23.28) (5.20) (65.12) (0.05)
Number of Observations 4256 4256 2033 2203 4268 3911 3713 4286 4495 4299
Number of Firms 765 765 722 722 765 761 753 765 765 765
P‐values testing:
   Cash = In‐kind Females 0.573 0.107 0.294 0.137 0.198 0.478 0.776 0.817 0.172 0.054
   Cash = In‐kind Males 0.212 0.291 0.693 0.630 0.111 0.428 0.942 0.856 0.573 0.611
Panel B: Female Sub‐sample
Cash Treatment*Low Profits ‐6.77 ‐6.78 0.07** 6.13** 7.26** 4.66 15.39 2.94 197.84*** 0.16**
(29.67) (29.69) (0.03) (2.80) (3.32) (4.24) (18.93) (4.11) (58.16) (0.06)
Cash Treatment*High Profits 238.00 145.84* 0.02 11.54 ‐2.13 8.29 ‐25.71 ‐8.05 ‐53.38 ‐0.07
(185.23) (85.70) (0.04) (8.35) (4.27) (8.08) (18.79) (5.48) (81.92) (0.06)
In‐kind Treatment*Low Profits 59.17** 59.17** 0.01 ‐0.40 1.11 4.10 3.83 ‐2.38 32.92 ‐0.02
(28.45) (28.46) (0.03) (2.02) (3.93) (5.20) (18.81) (3.09) (63.98) (0.06)
In‐kind Treatment*High Profits 262.60 223.24*** 0.03 5.12 ‐1.99 ‐2.43 ‐18.48 3.11 18.07 ‐0.04
(166.25) (77.66) (0.05) (6.76) (3.94) (8.01) (17.24) (7.79) (68.53) (0.06)
Number of Observations 2654 2654 1260 1260 2657 2440 2323 2666 2790 2670
Number of Firms 475 475 446 446 475 475 468 475 475 475
P‐values testing:
     Cash Treatments Equal 0.193 0.093 0.351 0.540 0.083 0.691 0.124 0.109 0.013 0.007
     In‐kind Treatments Equal 0.228 0.048 0.769 0.435 0.578 0.494 0.382 0.513 0.874 0.827
Notes:
All expenditure data truncated at the 99.5th percentile of the data.
All estimation includes wave effects which vary by gender, and by category in panel B. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the firm level. 
High and Low profits refers to groups defined on pre‐treatment profits.
Trimmed sample used. OLS estimation includes dummies for the matched quadruplets.
*, ** and *** denote significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.
Table 6: Comparison of Characteristics of High and Low Profit Women
Low High
Initial Profit Initial Profits Sri Lankan
Men Women Women Women
Monthly profits in January 2009a 
     Mean 130 38 173*** 28
     Median 91 37 137*** 20
Monthly sales in January 2009
     Mean 502 187 822*** 87
     Median 240 120 500*** 50
Total Capital Stock in January 2009
      Mean 611 251 456*** 207
      Median 255 102 162*** 100
Age of Owner 35.4 35.9 37.0 41.1
Age of Firm 9.1 6.0 7.4** 9.5
Ever had a formal loan 0.07 0.08 0.15** 0.23
Keeps accounts 0.45 0.31 0.44** 0.29
Years of Education 10.04 7.80 8.63** 9.44
Digitspan Recall 5.70 4.59 4.80 5.68
Chose sector as it had low capital requirements 0.17 0.40 0.32* n.a.
Chose sector for profit potential 0.18 0.11 0.18** n.a.
Willingness to Take Risks 5.64 4.28 4.40 6.08
Save regularly 0.71 0.62 0.73** 0.67
Household Asset index 0.29 ‐0.40 0.14*** n.a.
Household has a Cellphone 0.94 0.88 0.91 0.22
Sample Size 290 296 179 190
Notes:
Means shown unless indicated otherwise. Trimmed subsample used.
*, **, and *** indicate high profit women statistically different from the low profit women
at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.
a. Figures for Sri Lanka are reported as of March 2005 Sri Lankan baseline, converted at 
an approximate exchange rate of 100 Sri Lankan rupees to 1 cedi.
n.a. indicates not available in Sri Lankan data.
Table 7: Heterogeneity according to self‐control 
Dependent variable: Real profits
Interaction Category: Used a  Said they Discount Hyperbolic Lacks Says there is Can spend Household Number of
Susu at Save rate above Discounter Self‐control pressure to  freely without Size Siblings
Baseline regularly median share with hh spouse in Area
Panel A: Pooling Treatment Effects across Gender
Cash Treatment ‐5.117 ‐34.97** 13.26 6.219 2.768 1.187 ‐8.618 2.191 0.414
(11.05) (14.58) (13.92) (10.33) (8.579) (9.886) (18.29) (8.350) (8.624)
In‐kind Treatment 25.24 ‐4.260 13.97 40.35*** 29.80*** 31.54** 8.972 28.79*** 25.61**
(15.34) (9.341) (11.20) (14.49) (10.81) (12.49) (13.33) (10.62) (10.40)
Cash Treatment * Interaction 14.54 50.95*** ‐21.97 ‐18.70 ‐16.13** ‐0.705 13.44 5.937 2.166
(16.70) (17.69) (17.15) (16.82) (8.102) (17.82) (22.54) (4.238) (3.284)
In‐kind Treatment *Interaction 10.35 49.41*** 31.00 ‐38.88** ‐6.587 ‐23.61 20.68 0.451 6.469*
(20.80) (17.91) (20.66) (18.09) (6.273) (20.36) (20.09) (5.022) (3.835)
p‐value for testing interactions jointly zero 0.6355 0.001 0.1024 0.0708 0.0983 0.501 0.535 0.371 0.198
Observations 4,170 4,157 4,169 4,157 4,145 3,880 2,702 4,169 3,750
Number of firms 758 755 758 755 753 675 490 757 652
Panel B: Females Sub‐sample only
Cash Treatment ‐8.313 ‐20.90 9.207 0.955 ‐0.608 ‐3.369 0.710 ‐3.461 0.0197
(12.94) (17.44) (15.23) (10.69) (9.100) (10.76) (19.53) (8.711) (9.261)
In‐kind Treatment 24.79 ‐2.700 12.62 41.12** 31.20** 35.56** ‐4.982 30.52** 33.84**
(21.96) (8.508) (11.47) (17.56) (13.04) (17.04) (12.88) (13.40) (13.80)
Cash Treatment * Interaction 12.37 28.15 ‐19.78 ‐11.43 ‐11.65 16.55 2.671 10.49** 5.174**
(17.51) (20.15) (18.47) (18.97) (7.963) (16.63) (24.14) (4.602) (2.092)
In‐kind Treatment *Interaction 14.44 50.76** 38.26 ‐34.74 ‐3.526 ‐10.42 42.57** ‐1.392 2.144
(27.10) (20.86) (25.00) (23.17) (7.445) (23.13) (17.84) (6.528) (2.694)
p‐value for testing interactions jointly zero 0.704 0.033 0.139 0.297 0.318 0.479 0.051 0.064 0.045
Observations 2,588 2,586 2,587 2,580 2,574 2,398 1,730 2,592 2,375
Number of firms 471 470 471 469 468 418 312 471 414
Notes: Results from Fixed effects estimation on trimmed sample.
*, ** and *** denote significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.
All regressions include wave effects which vary with the interaction.
Table 8. Dependent Variable: Real Profits
Interaction is:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male
Cash Treatment ‐9.640 16.78 20.54 1.823 18.69 2.177 ‐0.0262 ‐3.651 0.710 ‐47.59 ‐8.692 ‐25.43 0.0859 7.697
(12.84) (24.73) (17.50) (60.36) (17.00) (30.95) (25.64) (33.45) (19.53) (47.88) (20.83) (27.64) (13.84) (21.89)
In‐kind Treatment 40.89 34.99 49.01* 23.79 40.52** 20.61 43.21 26.00 ‐4.982 29.59 32.56 147.1 64.50* 24.56
(33.71) (23.63) (27.46) (63.60) (17.86) (60.32) (27.16) (28.63) (12.88) (25.65) (23.58) (104.1) (33.17) (23.21)
Cash*Interaction 11.56 ‐17.11 ‐6.289 ‐14.47 0.752 1.820 ‐0.162 0.0687 2.671 55.74 8.387 34.63 ‐2.005 16.82
(17.18) (33.14) (27.52) (77.95) (2.474) (5.634) (2.339) (6.121) (24.14) (54.47) (24.37) (39.97) (17.24) (26.29)
In‐kind*Interaction ‐11.91 ‐12.19 ‐16.09 ‐6.332 0.101 6.441 0.0207 ‐2.986 42.57** ‐13.18 ‐0.605 ‐135.2 ‐54.76 12.98
(35.28) (34.08) (39.86) (84.32) (3.249) (9.761) (2.550) (4.113) (17.84) (43.76) (32.46) (108.0) (34.21) (37.70)
Observations 2,599 1,593 1,273 864 956 799 1,520 932 1,730 972 2,408 1,501 2,604 1,599
Number of firms 473 289 222 151 172 147 264 163 312 178 431 267 474 290
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Baseline profits
as share of consumption
Baseline profits
as share of incomemarried
Whether they are Spend income
without consent
Difference in education
between spouses
Share of assets
brought to marriage
Difference in age
between spouses
Table 9: Heterogeneity according to external pressure
Dependent variable: Real profits
Interaction Category: Household Says there is Number of
Size pressure to  Siblings
share with hh in Area
Panel A: Pooling Treatment Effects across Gender
Cash Treatment 2.191 1.187 0.414
(8.350) (9.886) (8.624)
In‐kind Treatment 28.79*** 31.54** 25.61**
(10.62) (12.49) (10.40)
Cash Treatment * Interaction 5.937 ‐0.705 2.166
(4.238) (17.82) (3.284)
In‐kind Treatment *Interaction 0.451 ‐23.61 6.469*
(5.022) (20.36) (3.835)
p‐value for testing interactions jointly zero 0.371 0.501 0.198
Observations 4,169 3,880 3,750
Number of firms 757 675 652
Panel B: Females Sub‐sample only
Cash Treatment ‐3.461 ‐3.369 0.0197
(8.711) (10.76) (9.261)
In‐kind Treatment 30.52** 35.56** 33.84**
(13.40) (17.04) (13.80)
Cash Treatment * Interaction 10.49** 16.55 5.174**
(4.602) (16.63) (2.092)
In‐kind Treatment *Interaction ‐1.392 ‐10.42 2.144
(6.528) (23.13) (2.694)
p‐value for testing interactions jointly zero 0.064 0.479 0.045
Observations 2,592 2,398 2,375
Number of firms 471 418 414
Notes: Results from Fixed effects estimation on trimmed sample.
*, ** and *** denote significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.
All regressions include wave effects which vary with the interaction.
Table 10: Is self‐control just proxying for external pressure
Dependent Variable: "Lack of Self‐control" Index
Males & Married Married  
Females Males & Females Females  Females
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Female ‐0.0860 ‐0.0969
(0.0885) (0.110)
Baseline profits below the median 0.0954 ‐0.00624 0.101 ‐0.0329
(0.0887) (0.113) (0.118) (0.148)
Says there is pressure to share extra profits 0.0505 ‐0.0609 0.0359 ‐0.111
  with other household members (0.103) (0.122) (0.138) (0.162)
Baseline household Size 0.0144 0.00290 ‐0.000428 ‐0.0191
(0.0226) (0.0305) (0.0307) (0.0404)
Number of Siblings in Accra/Tema 0.0239 0.0120 0.0378** 0.0250
(0.0157) (0.0208) (0.0190) (0.0238)
Agrees that whenever they have money on hand, their  0.0583 0.115 ‐0.00133 0.0620
   spouse or other family members always end up requesting some. (0.0989) (0.125) (0.128) (0.154)
Agrees that people who do well in their business are likely to receive  0.0393 ‐0.100 0.0916 ‐0.0605
  additional requests from family and friends for money to help out  (0.115) (0.146) (0.145) (0.184)
Agrees that machines and equipment held in their business are a good  0.0303 0.0507 ‐0.00774 ‐0.0186
   way of saving money so that others don’t take it.  (0.0906) (0.113) (0.115) (0.143)
At baseline spouse had compelled them to give money that they ‐0.0699 0.220
  didn't want to during last 3 months (0.158) (0.210)
Can spend their income without consulting their spouse ‐0.148 ‐0.219
(0.122) (0.156)
Spouse is supportive of them running a business ‐0.218 ‐0.215
(0.160) (0.204)
Constant 0.00766 0.487** ‐0.0548 0.493*
(0.130) (0.240) (0.157) (0.284)
Number of Observations 667 427 403 262
R‐squared 0.009 0.017 0.010 0.025
P‐value for testing joint insignificance of all variables 0.581 0.897 0.682 0.705
Notes:
Coefficients are from an OLS regression of an index formed as the first principal component of using a susu, saving regularly,
being a hyperbolic discounter, and having above the median discount rate on the variables listed in the table.
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.
Appendix Table A1: Attrition Rates by Round
All firms Control Cash In‐kind P‐value test 
of equality
Didn't Answer Survey
   Wave 1 0 0 0 0 1
   Wave 2 0 0 0 0 1
   Wave 3 0.029 0.031 0.010 0.042 0.106
   Wave 4 0.073 0.086 0.068 0.052 0.303
   Wave 5 0.112 0.131 0.099 0.089 0.262
   Wave 6 0.080 0.102 0.047 0.068 0.050
   Any Wave 0.166 0.196 0.131 0.141 0.070
Missing profits data
   Wave 1 0.080 0.091 0.071 0.071 0.615
   Wave 2 0.016 0.013 0.025 0.010 0.477
   Wave 3 0.069 0.076 0.061 0.071 0.740
   Wave 4 0.098 0.123 0.076 0.071 0.064
   Wave 5 0.129 0.149 0.121 0.106 0.207
   Wave 6 0.114 0.141 0.086 0.086 0.059
   Any Wave 0.285 0.329 0.236 0.246 0.019
Ever close business 0.064 0.073 0.063 0.047 0.463
Note: Test of equality if based on regression of attrition on treatment group
with controls for stratification groups and robust standard errors.
Appendix Table A2: Robustness of Treatment Effect to Lee Bounds 
Dependent Variable: Real Monthly Profits (Cedis)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS FE OLS OLS FE FE
Cash Treatment*Female 5.167 ‐2.298 6.093 1.148 ‐1.441 ‐3.297
(8.545) (8.768) (8.767) (7.106) (8.927) (7.226)
In‐kind Treatment*Female 37.65** 32.87** 40.88*** 9.378 35.34*** 11.06
(14.94) (13.21) (15.41) (7.066) (13.59) (7.661)
Cash Treatment*Male 16.81 5.132 21.82 6.218 9.154 ‐5.718
(13.25) (16.10) (13.28) (11.28) (16.02) (13.87)
In‐kind Treatment*Male 35.45** 27.83 37.26*** 14.71 28.11 8.421
(14.04) (18.15) (14.07) (10.14) (18.21) (14.07)
Lee Bounding No No Upper Lower Upper Lower
Number of Observations 4203 4203 4165 4167 4165 4167
Number of Firms 764 764 764 764 764 764
Notes:
All estimation includes wave effects. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the firm level. 
Trimmed Sample used for all columns
OLS estimation includes dummies for the matched quadruplets.
*, ** and *** denote significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.
Appendix Table A3: How does Treatment Effect Vary with Time Since Treatment?
Dependent Variable: Real Monthly Profits
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS OLS FE FE OLS FE OLS FE
Cash Treatment at 3 months 14.27 9.12 5.89 1.13 5.05 ‐2.58 11.52 3.25
(10.26) (8.01) (11.23) (8.31) (15.03) (15.86) (9.15) (9.24)
Cash Treatment at 6 months 7.18 6.30 ‐1.36 ‐2.75 16.11 5.90 ‐0.18 ‐8.42
(9.86) (9.16) (17.27) (10.34) (17.21) (20.45) (10.32) (10.91)
Cash Treatment at 9 months 12.97 5.99 9.60 3.74 12.64 11.01 2.37 ‐0.30
(12.23) (10.96) (15.97) (11.07) (20.12) (21.36) (12.47) (11.93)
Cash Treatment at 12 months 38.09*** 27.98** 17.73 17.01 57.54*** 30.41 10.01 8.82
(13.55) (12.81) (23.52) (13.42) (20.87) (25.94) (16.15) (14.69)
In‐kind Treatment at 3 months 26.37** 26.65** 30.20** 18.86* 33.59 25.34 22.25* 14.81
(12.10) (11.42) (12.64) (11.36) (22.86) (24.82) (11.89) (10.06)
In‐kind Treatment at 6 months 34.62*** 32.61*** 38.34*** 25.49** 19.12 9.98 41.03*** 35.16***
(11.68) (11.19) (12.75) (10.93) (15.11) (18.99) (15.44) (13.10)
In‐kind Treatment at 9 months 48.33** 48.90** 54.91*** 45.24** 39.49** 36.59* 54.76* 50.66*
(20.63) (19.96) (20.25) (18.50) (17.33) (19.41) (30.35) (27.33)
In‐kind Treatment at 12 months 58.35*** 46.91*** 78.17*** 58.00*** 69.76* 75.71** 32.76* 47.10***
(19.42) (17.52) (19.23) (17.02) (35.62) (36.58) (17.47) (15.33)
Constant 119.70*** 102.20*** 120.34*** 103.05*** 127.88*** 128.69*** 86.43*** 87.33***
(8.85) (4.40) (7.38) (3.71) (7.52) (6.47) (5.40) (4.49)
Baseline trimming No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 4354 4203 4354 4203 1599 1599 2604 2604
Number of Firms 792 764 792 764 290 290 474 474
P‐value for testing constant effect:
   of Cash Treatments 0.166 0.435 0.262 0.389 0.170 0.534 0.579 0.353
  of In‐kind Treatments 0.492 0.577 0.121 0.163 0.458 0.249 0.189 0.057
Notes:
All estimation includes wave effects. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the firm level.
 *, ** and *** denote significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.
Trimmed specifications trim out matched quadruplets which have at least one firm with profits above 1500 cedis per month in wave 1 or 2.
OLS estimation includes dummies for the matched quadruplets.
Males and Females Pooled Males Females
